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Review of Privileged Documents in Trial and Deposition 
Preparation of Witnesses in New York: When, if Ever, 
Will the Privilege be Lost? 
 




Trial and deposition witnesses may forget or fail to mention 
a relevant fact during the course of their examination at a trial 
or deposition.2  Such forgetfulness is inevitable,3 and not an 
unusual occurrence due to the lapse of time since the fact was 
perceived, the complexity of the subject matter involved, or even 
the nervousness of the witness during the examination itself.4  
The best of witnesses, like the rest of us, can forget things that 
occurred in the past. 
When the witness suffers such a memory loss while 
testifying, it is standard trial practice of the examining attorney, 
as permitted under the common law of evidence in all state and 
federal jurisdictions, to attempt to refresh the witness’s 
recollection in order to have the witness testify to the forgotten 
relevant fact.  Refreshing recollection is “a last-ditch means to 
secure information known to the witness but apparently lost to 
 
 1.  Professor of Law, Albany Law School. 
2.  John M. Maguire & Charles W. Quick, Testimony: Memory and 
Memoranda, 3 HOW. L.J. 1, 1 (1957) (“Impermanence and erratic flightiness of 
human memory are great perils of litigation.”).  
3.  Brittany R. Cohen, “Whose Line is it Anyway?”: Reducing Witness 
Coaching by Prosecutors, 18 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 985, 986 (2015) (“In 
an ideal world, human memory would be infallible and . . . human beings 
would have the ability to remember and relay events exactly how they 
occurred.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Human memory is inherently 
flawed . . . .”).   
4.  See generally 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET. AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 
§ 9, at 48-49 (7th ed. 2013); ROGER C. PARK ET. AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S 
GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS § 1.08, at 22 
(3d ed. 2010); Joseph J. Kalo, Refreshing Recollection: Problems with Laying a 
Foundation, 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 233, 233 (1979); Stephen A. Saltzburg, 
Refreshing Recollection: Witnesses with Memory Problems, 25 CRIM. JUST., 43, 
43 (2010) (“It is not unusual in cases for witnesses, especially those who have 
little experience testifying and are nervous, to forget things.”). 
1
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conscious memory, hence lying beyond reach of ordinary direct.”5  
A writing of some variety is usually employed in this process.6  
When the effort is successful, the witness can testify from his or 
her now revived memory.  However, the witness’s testimony may 
be perceived as less than credible because of the process 
preceding it. 
How then is the refreshing recollection scenario avoided or 
at least minimized?  The witness will, and must, be “prepped” 
before testifying.  Witness preparation refers to the process 
where an attorney discusses with a witness the witness’s 
prospective testimony at a forthcoming trial or deposition.7  It 
has been noted that “American litigators regularly use witness 
preparation, and virtually all would, upon reflection, consider it 
a fundamental duty of representation and a basic element of 
effective advocacy.”8  During the discussion the attorney will, 
among other things, review with the witness the witness’s 
personal knowledge and recollection of the facts relevant to the 
action.  The witness may review at the session, or even in 
advance of the session at the request of the attorney or his or her 
own initiative, various writings to refresh the witness’s 
recollection when the witness is unable to relate the totality of 
relevant facts within the witness’s personal knowledge or when 
the relevant facts as related by the witness conflict or are 
 
5.  3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 6:93, at 585-86 (4th ed. 2013).  
6.  3 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL 
& CRIMINAL § 32:3 (7th ed. 2016). When used in this article, the term “writing” 
is to be read as including documents, records, memoranda, or other papers in 
any form including electronic and photographs.  
7.  CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 647-48 (1986). 
8.  John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 278-79 
(1989). It must be noted that a failure to engage in any witness preparation 
and even a failure to adequately prepare a witness, may be a violation of an 
attorney’s ethical duty to provide competent representation to a client in 
violation of ethical standards and rules.  See United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 
310, 319 (4th Cir. 2000).  Such a failure may also form the basis for a legal 
malpractice claim.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) (general negligence standard may 
require interviews with witnesses); Caso v. Miranda Sambursky Sloane 
Sklarin Ver Veniotis LLP, 54 N.Y.S.3d 386 (App. Div. 2017) (citing the First 
Department decision that Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his attorney’s 
inadequate witness preparation prior to the witness’s deposition were based 
upon a failure to refresh the witness’s recollection stated a claim for legal 
malpractice).   
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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inconsistent with other available evidence.9  The goal is, of 
course, to ensure that the witness’s testimony at the trial or 
deposition is complete, accurate, and not unexpected.  As one 
court has noted: “This sort of preparation is essential to the 
proper presentation of a case and to avoid surprise.”10 
While such discussions present no ethical concerns for the 
attorney, provided they are conducted properly,11 a concern of 
another nature arises: Should a privileged writing be shown to 
the witness?  It may be that such a writing is the best or perhaps 
the only tool for refreshing recollection purposes.12  However, a 
risk is created by such a showing, namely, that the privileged 
writing will now have to be disclosed to the opposing attorney.13  
The opposing attorney will have become aware of such use by 
the inevitable question to the witness during the questioning to 
identify the writings which were reviewed by the witness during 
the preparation sessions.  A disclosure of this nature can be 
devastating to the attorney who prepped the witness, adversely 
impacting the attorney’s client, especially where the writing 
contains comments and statements about the attorney’s theory 
of the case, evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of the 
parties’ case, or actions to be undertaken.  While the witness’s 
recollection may have been refreshed, the cost of doing so may 
 
9.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt. 
b (AM. LAW. INST. 2000); Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995). 
10.  Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango, Co. v. Fire Ass’n of Phila., 20 F.R.D. 181, 
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).  
11.  Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional Conduct and the Preparation 
of Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of “Coaching”, 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1987). When witness preparation becomes 
problematic from an ethical perspective is a topic beyond the scope of this 
article.  For comprehensive reviews of this problem, see Wydick, supra note 9.  
12.  See Ettie Ward, The Litigator’s Dilemma: Waiver of Core Work 
Product Used in Trial Preparation, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 515, 522-23 (1988) 
(discussing reasons why attorney would provide witnesses with privileged 
documents). 
13.  See generally Alfred F. Belcuore, Use It and Lose It – Privileged 
Documents, Preparing Witnesses and Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 171 (1984); Daisy Hurst Floyd, A “Delicate and Difficult 
Task”: Balancing the Competing Interests of Federal Rule of Evidence 612, the 
Work Product Doctrine, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 101 
(1996); Michael Keeley & Michael D. Feiler, You Can’t Ask That! Asserting 
Work Product Protection for Deposition Preparation Materials, 40 BRIEF 34 
(2011).   
3
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result in the loss of an otherwise winnable case. 
Under New York law, can the review of a privileged writing 
by a witness in a preparation session prior to a trial or a 
deposition lead to the writing’s privileged status being lost?  
While it is well established in New York that the use of any 
writing to refresh the recollection of a testifying witness at a 
trial or deposition triggers an automatic disclosure of the writing 
to opposing counsel, irrespective of its privileged nature,14 New 
York law is unclear as to the consequences, if any, when the 
witness reviews a privileged document prior to trial or 
deposition.  Specifically, in the absence of a governing statutory 
provision and Court of Appeals precedent on point, it is unclear 
as to whether: (1) the automatic disclosure rule applies at all in 
the witness preparation context; (2) if the automatic disclosure 
rule does apply, does a mere showing to or review of the writing 
by the witness trigger disclosure, or will disclosure be mandated 
only if the witness uses the writing to refresh his or her 
recollection; and (3) can disclosure of a writing be ordered over a 
claim of privilege.  Notably, Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and federal court decisions interpreting the Rule, 
provide guidance to how these questions are determined and 
answered.  However, there is not always unanimity among the 
federal courts on these matters. 
This article will examine New York’s refreshing recollection 
doctrine in the context of trial and deposition preparation of 
witnesses as to the consequences of the witness’s review of 
privileged writings.  Initially, Part II will discuss Rule 612 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  The discussion will serve as the 
backdrop for the analysis of the above-mentioned issues under 
New York law.  Part III will then examine the refreshing 
recollection doctrine as developed and applied to testifying 
witnesses at a trial or deposition by the New York courts.  The 
examination will point out the doctrine’s key rules.  Part IV 
discusses the treatment of these key rules by the New York 
courts in the witness preparation situation, both pre-trial and 
pre-deposition, showing the shortcomings of this judicial 
treatment and advocating for change.  Lastly, Part V makes 
some suggestions to the attorney in light of current New York 
 
14.  See infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.   
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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law as to avoidance in the preparation of witnesses before they 
testify at a trial or a deposition of the disclosure of otherwise 
privileged writings. 
 
II. Federal Rule of Evidence 612 
 
 A. Rule 612 
 
Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 612 provides: 
 
Rule 612. Writing Used to Refresh a Witness’s 
Memory 
 
(a) Scope. This rule gives an adverse party certain 
options when a witness uses a writing to refresh 
memory: 
(1) while testifying; or 
(2) before testifying, if the court decides that 
justice requires the party to have those options. 
 
(b) Adverse Party’s Options; Deleting Unrelated 
Matter. Unless 18 U.S.C. § 3500 provides 
otherwise in a criminal case, an adverse party is 
entitled to have the writing produced at the 
hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the 
witness about it, and to introduce in evidence any 
portion that relates to the witness’s testimony. If 
the producing party claims that the writing 
includes unrelated matter, the court must 
examine the writing in camera, delete any 
unrelated portion, and order that the rest be 
delivered to the adverse party. Any portion 
deleted over objection must be preserved for the 
record. 
 
(c) Failure to Produce or Deliver the Writing. If a 
writing is not produced or is not delivered as 
ordered, the court may issue any appropriate 
order. But if the prosecution does not comply in a 
5
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criminal case, the court must strike the witness’s 
testimony or—if justice so requires—declare a 
mistrial.15 
 
Rule 612 covers a small part of the refreshing recollection 
doctrine as applied in the federal courts.  Under that doctrine, 
when a witness is unable to relate facts within the witness’s 
knowledge, the examining attorney is afforded the opportunity 
to refresh the witness’s testimony through the use of a writing 
or object.16  The basics of the doctrine, i.e., when the doctrine can 
be invoked and the mechanics of its use, are governed by 
common law rules adopted and developed by the federal courts.17  
Rule 612 governs only the mechanics of the production, 
inspection, and use of writings used to refresh a witness’s 
recollection at trial while testifying or before testifying. 
The inspection and use right given to an adverse party for 
writings used to refresh the witness’s recollection while 
testifying is unqualified.  However, the right as given for 
writings used before testifying is subject to the discretion of the 
court, and production and inspection is only required if “justice 
requires.” 
Of note, the Rule, on its face, provides no privilege-based 
exception to the inspection and use right, either when a writing 
is used to refresh a witness’s recollection while testifying or 
before testifying.  Furthermore, while the Rule’s inspection right 
clearly applies to writings used to refresh a witness’s recollection 
before a trial, it is silent as to whether it is operative term 
“testifying” applies in the context of preparing a witness for a 







15.  FED. R. EVID. 612. 
16.  See BROUN ET. AL., supra note 4, at 48-49. 
17.  See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, §§ 6:94-6:97; 4 
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§§ 612.01-09 (Mark S. Brodin & Joseph M. McLaughlin eds., 2d ed. 2016). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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 B. Legislative History 
 
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted on January 2, 
1975 and deemed effective on July 1, 1975.18  The pre-enactment 
history of the Federal Rules of Evidence is extensive.19  
Specifically, Rule 612’s legislative history consists of three 
Reporter’s drafts, prepared from 1965 through 1968,20 three 
Advisory Committee drafts, prepared from March 1969 through 
November 1972,21 and reports of congressional hearings 
compiled from testimony at congressional hearings and 
comments received as a result of the hearings.22  The history of 
Rule 612 as gleaned from these documents is clear and 
instructive as to the differing treatment of the inspection and 
use right specifically granted by the Rule, depending upon 
whether the use of the writing occurred while the witness was 
testifying or before testifying.  However, as to the issue of 
whether the Rule could be employed to override a claim that the 
writing could not be disclosed because it was privileged, the 
legislative history is ambiguous as to the reason for the omission 
of the treatment of a claimed privilege in the Rule. 
As to the inspection and use right granted to the adverse 
party, the Advisory Committee initially proposed in the 
Preliminary Draft of March 1969 that an adverse party is 
entitled to have such right not only as to any document used by 
a witness to refresh the witness’s recollection while testifying, 
but also as to any other document used prior to testifying for 
refreshing recollection purposes.  The right as granted was 
 
18.  Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. 
No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926, 1936 (1975).  
19.  An excellent resource for this history is the FRE Legislative History 
Overview Resource Page, FED. EVIDENCE REV., http://federalevidence.com/ 
legislative-history-overview (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
20.  See RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE: TEXT AND HISTORY xi-xii, 258-59 (2015).  
21.  See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 183, 276-
77 (1973) (transmitted by the United States Supreme Court to Congress); 
Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Revised Draft of 
Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315, 399-400 (1971); Comm. on Rules of 
Prac. & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules 
of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 306-07 (1969).  
22.  See FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 20, at xiii-xv.  
7
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unqualified.  In support of this proposal, the Committee stated: 
 
The treatment of writings used to refresh 
recollection while on the stand is in accord with 
settled doctrine. The bulk of the case law has, 
however, denied the existence of any right to 
access by the opponent when the writing is used 
prior to taking the stand, though the judge may 
have discretion in the matter. An increasing group 
of cases has repudiated the distinction., and this 
position is believed to be correct. As Wigmore put 
it, “the risk of imposition and the need of 
safeguard is just as great” in both situations. To 
the same effect is McCormick.23 
 
The McCormick treatise cited in the Advisory Committee 
Note stated the policy ground that supports this right of 
inspection and use as follows: 
 
With the memorandum in hand, the cross-
examiner has a good opportunity to test the 
credibility of the witness’s claim that her memory 
has been revived, and to search out any 
discrepancies between the writing and the 
testimony. For instance, if there is no evident 
nexus between the contents of the writing and the 
fact purportedly remembered, the cross-examiner 
can attack the plausibility of the witness’s 
testimony that viewing the writing helped the 
witness remember that fact. In the past, this 
inspection right was usually limited to writings 
used by the witness on the stand. However, the 
policy reasons for inspection seem equally 
applicable to writings used by the witness to 
refresh her memory before she testifies.24 
 
 
23.  Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 21, at 
307-08 (citations omitted). 
24.  BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 55-56 (citation omitted).  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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Opposition to this proposal came from the Department of 
Justice and Senator John McClelland.25  Among other concerns 
expressed was that “cross-examination of witnesses may 
deteriorate into lengthy fishing expeditions on the part of 
counsel seeking to inquire what pieces of paper a witness has 
seen during the courts of preparation for his testimony.”26  
Responding to these concerns, the House Judiciary Committee 
amended the proposed Rule to make the right of inspection and 
use a discretionary one by adding after “before testifying” the 
words “if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in 
the interests of justice.”27  Its Report states: 
 
As submitted to Congress, Rule 612 provided that 
except as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3500, if a witness 
uses a writing to refresh his memory for the 
purpose of testifying, “either before or while 
testifying,” an adverse party is entitled to have 
the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, 
to cross-examine the witness on it, and to 
introduce in evidence those portions relating to 
the witness’ testimony. The Committee amended 
the Rule so as still to require the production of 
writings used by a witness while testifying, but to 
render the production of writings used by a 
witness to refresh his memory before testifying 
discretionary with the court in the interests of 
justice, as is the case under existing federal law. 
See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 
(1942). The Committee considered that 
permitting an adverse party to require the 
 
25.  See Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General, 
United States, to Albert Branson Maris, Federal Judge, United States (1971) 
(available at 117 CONG. REC. 33648, 33656-57) [hereinafter KLEINDIENST 
LETTER]; Letter from John Little McClellan, Senator, United States, to Albert 
Branson Maris, Federal Judge, United States (1971) (available at 117 CONG. 
REC. 33642, 33645-46) [hereinafter MCCLELLAN LETTER].  
26.  KLEINDIENST LETTER, supra note 25, at 33657; MCCLELLAN LETTER, 
supra note 25, at 33645. 
27.  H.R REP. NO. 93-650 (1973), as reprinted in FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra 
note 20, at 262 [hereinafter House Report]. The compromise reached and the 
discussions leading up to it are fully discussed in 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER 
& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 347, 597-99 (2d ed. 1994).  
9
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production of writings used before testifying could 
result in fishing expeditions among a multitude of 
papers which a witness may have used in 
preparing for trial.28 
 
With respect to the privilege issue, attorneys, academic 
commentators, and federal judges provided their comments 
about the potential conflict between Rule 612 as proposed and 
privilege law.29  The House Report concerning Rule 612 stated: 
“The Committee intend[ed] that nothing in the Rule be 
construed as barring the assertion of a privilege with respect to 
writings used by a witness to refresh his memory.”30  A 
discussion on the House floor between Representative Hungate 
(House Manager of the Federal Rules of Evidence Bill) and 
Representative White is also revealing: 
 
Mr. WHITE. If there is, for instance, 
hypothetically, a personal injury action, that is, if 
a party to the personal injury action asks for the 
work of an attorney. . .on matters on which the 
party has re-trial [and must refresh his memory 
before trial], then would the adverse attorney and 
adverse party have the opportunity to inspect that 
work? 
 
Mr. HUNGATE. If the gentleman will yield, I 
understand—and if I am in error, some other 
members of the committee can correct me—the 
attorney’s work product would not be subject to 
that inspection. 
If it was used to refresh the memory of a witness 




28.  House Report, supra note 27, at 13. 
29.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, at 583-84; Martha J. 
Aaron, Resolving the Conflict Between Federal Rule of Evidence 612 and the 
Work-Product Doctrine: A Proposed Solution, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1039, 1045-46 
(1990).   
30.  House Report, supra note 27, at 13. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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If it was used while testifying. If it were used 
before testifying there are different limitations on 
it. 
 
Mr. WHITE. You see, the way it reads, it says 
“before testifying.” In other words, if you use it 
before testifying then it is a memory refreshener 
[sic]. 
 
Mr. HUNGATE. It can become a discretionary 
matter with the court in that case. The rule was 
originally broader than this, as I recall it. We have 
tried to narrow the past rule, the rule that one 
point could have meant bringing in everything 
you used to refresh your memory, and the 
committee has sought to restrict that. You could 
use the classic examples, for instance, of patent 
cases or antitrust cases where you might have 
several large railroad boxcars full of documents, 
and to force them to be brought in could prove to 
be harassment. 
 
Mr. WHITE. Does not the chairman’s own 
interpretation mean that at the court’s discretion 
the court could insist that the adverse party bring 
to the opponent the material on which the witness 
refreshed his memory, is that correct? 
 
Mr. HUNGATE. The gentleman is raising a good 
point, because I think the gentleman is putting 
two legal concepts at each other’s throats, one 
would be perhaps the original work product of the 
attorney, and I am not qualified to say that this is 
paramount, but it was not meant to repeal the 
attorney-client relationship, and, let me add, this 
does not write that out of its present existence. It 
does not do away with it. What we concentrated 
upon was in these extremely long cases where 
there would be lots and lots of documents, and 
where it would be a harassment to have them all 
11
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brought in. 
 
And it says, again, as the gentleman I am sure 
realizes: 
 
If the court in its discretion determines it is 
necessary in the interest of justice. . . . 
 
Mr. WHITE. Is not this then a change in the rule, 
a change from the general evidentiary rules in the 
Federal courts? 
 
Mr. HUNGATE. That is not the case, as I 
understand it. 
 
Mr. WHITE. Presently in civil actions or personal 
injury actions, using the same hypothetical 
question, can an opponent obtain the material on 
which a witness refreshed his memory before he 
comes to testify, before the case? 
 
Mr. HUNGATE. He could not do so. 
 
Mr. WHITE. So this is a radical change. 
 
The point I am trying to make is that this is an 
inconsistency, that a man would have to produce 
the writings that he had used prior to coming to 
testify, whatever he refreshed his memory on, but 
he probably could not use the same writing in that 
regard, if these were self-serving to him. The 
lawyer’s own work product would then be subject 
to inspection if it was used to refresh the memory 
of a witness, and thus you have intruded into a 
very established rule of law. 
 
Mr. HUNGATE. However, we come back to the 
fact that this does not wipe out the other sections 
of the law, or the law as it exists regarding the 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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privilege of attorney-client relationships, or their 
work products.31 
 
Despite this attention to the issue, it was never resolved.32  
The legislative history of the Rule shows only that the Rule 
apparently was not intended to eliminate privilege protection for 
writings protected by a privilege, but fails to show how privilege 
rights are to be accommodated with the inspection and use right, 
if at all. 
Lastly, there is no indication in Rule 612’s legislative history 
that discussion was had as to whether the inspection and use 
right was applicable where a witness’s recollection was being 
refreshed in preparation for a deposition.  A commentator has 
noted that the Rule’s requirement of document disclosure “at a 
hearing” strongly suggests that the Advisory Committee and 
Congress had only trials in mind.33  On the other hand, another 
commentator has contended that the words “for the purpose of 
testifying” and the explanation for those words in the Advisory 
Committee’s Notes shows Congress intended to have the right 
apply to a pre-deposition review of documents by a witness.34  
These differing interpretations raise the issue as to legislative 
intent, but do not resolve it. 
 
 C. Judicial Construction of Rule 612 
 
     1. Applicability to Depositions 
 
The courts addressed early on the issue left open by 
Congress of whether Rule 612 applied to deposition testimony 
where the deponent-witness’s recollection was refreshed by the 
use of a writing while testifying or before testifying.  After noting 
 
31.  120 CONG. REC. 1301, 2381-82 (1974). 
32.  Alfreda Robinson, Duet or Duel: Federal Rule of Evidence 612 and the 
Work Product Doctrine Codified in Civil Procedure Rule 26(B)(3), 69 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 197, 206-07 (2000) (noting the extensive consideration by members of 
Congress to Rule 612).  
33.  See John S. Applegate, Preparing for Rule 612, 19 LITIG. 17, 17-18 
(1993) (noting that a deposition is not called a “hearing”).  
34.  Robinson, supra note 32, at 205 (noting the phrase is a “safeguard 
against using the rule as a pretext for wholesale exploration of an opposing 
party’s files”).  
13
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that with respect to this issue the Rule itself is “silent” and its 
legislative history “somewhat ambiguous,”35 the courts have 
consistently held the Rule is applicable to deposition testimony 
through Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.36  The 
portion of Rule 30(c)(1) the courts relied upon provides that 
“[t]he examination and cross-examination of a deponent 
proceed[s] as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, except Rules 103 and 615.”37  One court has also noted 
that since deposition transcripts are frequently used at trial in 
place of live testimony, it is appropriate to conclude that Rule 
612 does apply to deposition testimony.38 
There is contrary authority.  In Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. 
Foster Wheeler Corp.,39 the court held Rule 612 did not apply to 
deposition testimony.40  The court’s rationale for so holding was 
as follows: 
 
[T]he notes of the Advisory Committee talk of use 
of writings to refresh recollection while a witness 
is “on the stand” or prior to “taking the stand.”  
While it may be argued that a deposition witness 
is on the “stand” during a civil deposition 
examination, it is unlikely that such a meaning is 
reasonable when you analyze the entire Rule, the 
Committee Note and the cases cited by the 
Committee in conjunction with the Note.  Thus, it 
appears that the first sentence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
30(c) deals only with the procedures for 
 
35.  See, e.g., Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 
467 (D. Md. 1948). 
36.  See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1985); Magee v. 
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); James Julian, 
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982); Marshall v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. 
Underwriters Labs., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
37.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1).  
38.  Nutramax Labs., 183 F.R.D. at 467 n.7.  FED. R. CIV. P. 32 permits the 
use of deposition transcripts at a trial and FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) permits, as 
an exception to the hearsay rule, the admission of transcripts of prior 
testimony from a trial.  
39.  Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 109 F.R.D. 615 (D. 
Neb. 1986).  
40.  Id. at 616. 
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examination and cross-examination and not with 
the substance of the examination.  Otherwise, the 
plain language of Rule 612 would permit a broad 
ranging inquiry into highly protected opinion 
work product, something clearly not envisioned by 
the drafters of the Rule.  The word “testifying” as 
used in the Rule contemplates the presentation of 
evidence at a hearing before a judge or 
magistrate.41 
 
While the court’s rationale is supportable,42 no other court 
has adopted its holding and it stands “virtually alone in its 
position that Evidence Rule 162(2) [sic] does not apply in a 
deposition setting.”43 
 
     2. Meaning of “While Testifying” 
 
The distinction between “while testifying” and “before 
testifying” as set forth in Rule 612(a) is readily apparent and 
seemingly needs no clarification.  However, an issue concerning 
this distinction arose in Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.44  In this 
case, Plaintiff contacted an attorney in search of legal advice for 
an employment discrimination action she wanted to pursue.  The 
attorney directed her to complete a form entitled “Possible Case 
Intake” and provide a chronological summary of events in the 
form.  She did as directed and returned the completed form to 
the attorney.  An employment discrimination action was 
subsequently commenced against Defendant, her employer.  At 
Plaintiff’s deposition, defense counsel asked her questions 
regarding any statements she had prepared about her 
employment.  She testified that she had prepared a statement 
on her own but could not remember whether it was made before 
or after she met with the attorney.45  At that point a recess was 
taken.  When the deposition continued, Plaintiff testified: “After 
 
41.  Id. at 616-17 (citation omitted). 
42.  See Applegate, supra note 33, at 18. 
43.  Napolitano v. Omaha Airport Auth., No. 8:08CV299, 2009 WL 
1393392, at *3 (D. Neb. May 11, 2009). 
44.  See Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403 (D. Kan. 1998). 
45.  Id. at 406. 
15
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we took a break, my lawyer showed me the documents, and I 
remembered that I wrote them in November 1996 at my 
attorney’s request.”46  This review, she further testified, “helped 
me to place the date when I wrote he [sic] documents . . . .”47 
Defendant then moved to compel production of those 
referenced documents.  It argued that the documents were not 
privileged, and, even if they were, that status did not preclude 
production because they had the right to inspect and use the 
documents since she used the documents to refresh her memory 
while testifying at her deposition.48  Plaintiff argued that the 
documents were protected by privilege and that Defendant was 
not automatically entitled to inspect them just because Plaintiff 
used them before testifying at her deposition, requiring the 
documents to be produced only if the court in its discretion so 
ordered, an order that was not warranted at that time.49 
The court denied the motion to compel.  It initially concluded 
the form was protected by the attorney-client privilege.50  It then 
held that the automatic right of inspection and use of documents 
to refresh a witness’s recollection, which could override the 
privilege, did not apply as Plaintiff reviewed the documents 
“before testifying” and not while testifying.  It stated: 
 
Within the meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 612(1), “while 
testifying” requires more than the fact that the 
review occurred after commencement but before 
completion of a deposition. Plaintiff had left the 
witness stand.  Transcription had ceased until her 
testimony resumed. She proffered no testimony 
during the break. In short, she was not then 
testifying. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 
612 support the finding that plaintiff reviewed the 
document “before testifying.” They equate “while 
testifying” to “while on the stand” and “before 
testifying” to “prior to taking the stand.”  See 
Fed.R.Evid. 612 advisory committee notes.  Her 
 
46.  Id. at 407. 
47.  Id. (alteration in original). 
48.  Id. at 405. 
49.  Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403, 407 (D. Kan. 1998). 
50.  Id. at 405. 
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review of the document impacted only testimony 
after her deposition recommenced.  The review 
occurred before she took the stand to begin her 
after-break testimony.51 
 
The Court’s holding has been criticized as form over 
substance.52  The argument is that because the refreshing 
occurred on matters that were being examined on at the time of 
the review, the review occurred “while testifying.”53 
 
 D. Meaning of “Uses a Writing to Refresh Memory” 
 
Rule 612 grants an inspection and use right with respect to 
a document only when a witness “uses a writing to refresh 
memory.”54  While this foundation element for invoking the right 
is obviously ascertainable when the refreshing recollection 
process is pursued while a witness is testifying and the 
recollection is refreshed, use of a writing before a trial or a 
deposition to refresh a witness’s recollection is not as apparent.55  
When use is present in the latter situation has been the subject 
of several federal court decisions. 
The courts have uniformly held that to trigger the 
inspection and use right, it must be established that the witness 
actually relied on the writing to refresh his or her recollection 
for the purpose of testifying.56  Thus, merely looking at a 
document prior to testifying will not trigger inspection and use.57 
 
 
51.  Id. at 407-08. 
52.  See 2 PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES § 9:40, 260 (2013-14 ed. 2013). 
53.  Id.  
54.  FED. R. EVID. 612(a). 
55.  4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 612.05, at 612-49 n.1 (1987) (“There is no mechanism for 
ascertaining the existence of the writings used other than reliance on the 
integrity of witness and counsel.”). 
56.  1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 358, 360 (3d 
ed. 2015) (“most courts require a showing that the privileged material actually 
impacted the witness’s testimony.”). 
57.  See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674, 679 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Hawaii), Ltd., 85 
F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
17
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This requirement of use is designed to ensure that the 
writing is relevant to an attempt to test the credibility of the 
witness.58  It also safeguards against use of the right of 
inspection and use granted by the Rule “as a pretext for 
wholesale exploitation of an opposing party’s files.”59 
Thomas v. Euro RSCG Life60 is illustrative of the analysis 
to be employed in determining use.  In this case, Plaintiff 
acknowledged that she reviewed shortly before her deposition 
chronological notes provided in confidence by her to her attorney 
for the purpose of seeking legal advice.  She also admitted that 
it would have been “very difficult” for her to recall all of the 
events without referring to those notes.61  Under these 
circumstances the Court concluded that Plaintiff relied on her 
notes in connection with her deposition testimony.62  In addition, 
the Court noted that events summarized in the notes “were a 
central part of the deposition” and were “likely to play a 
substantial role in Plaintiff’s case.”63  As a result, the notes 
would have a significant impact on the Plaintiff’s testimony.  
Thus, the Court concluded that it would exercise its discretion 
to order disclosure of the notes.64 
As Thomas indicates, the proof necessary to establish the 
requisite use will ordinarily be obtained by an examination of 
the witness at the deposition or at the trial.  The examining 
attorney will need to examine the witness as to documents relied 
upon in giving his or her testimony and whether those 
documents influenced the testimony.65  To be sure, the witness 
 
58.  Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1985) (“the document is of 
little utility for impeachment and cross-examination without a showing that 
the document actually influenced the witness’ testimony.”). 
59.  Id. at 317. 
60.  Thomas v. Euro RSCG Life, 264 F.R.D. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
61.  Id. at 122.  
62.  Id.  
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  It should be noted that where the witness has been provided certain 
writings, and those writings as selected or culled from numerous other 
documents, the provided documents may be protected as core attorney work-
product.  See James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 
1982) (“In selecting and ordering a few documents out of thousands counsel 
could not help but reveal important aspects of his understanding of the case.  
Indeed, in a case such as this, involving extensive document discovery, the 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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may testify that he or she only “looked at” writings prior to 
testifying, seeking to preclude production of those documents.  
In such a situation, examination of the witness as to specific 
writings reviewed and the amount of time reviewing the 
writings may inferentially establish that the writings were 
relied upon to refresh the witness’s recollection.66  Where the 
time involved was considerable and the witness can recall 
specific writings received, the use of these writings for 
refreshing recollection purposes can be established, 
notwithstanding the witness’s contrary statement.67 
 
 E. Automatic Disclosure and Discretionary Disclosure 
 
As previously discussed,68 Rule 612 grants a right of 
inspection and use to an adversary party of the writing used to 
refresh a witness’s recollection.  With respect to the standard to 
be applied for the implementation of this right, the Rule 
distinguishes between two situations.  Where the witness’s 
recollection is refreshed by the writing, the Rule grants an 
absolute or unqualified right to inspect and use whereas if the 
witness’s recollection is refreshed by a writing before testifying 
at either a trial or deposition, the adversary party has access to 
the writing only if the court decides that “justice requires” it.  
While the “absolute” right part of the Rule has presented no 
problems for the courts to resolve,69 its discretionary part has 
 
process of selection and distillation is often more critical than pure legal 
research. There can be no doubt that at least in the first instance the binders 
were entitled to protection as work product.”).  But see Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. 
of Pittsburg, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 01-2009-KHV, 2002 WL 113879, at *1 (D. 
Kan. Jan. 22, 2002) (court required identification of documents shown to 
witness prior to his deposition, rejecting argument that selection of such 
documents constituted core attorney work-product). 
66.  See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (for Rule 612 to apply it must be shown “at least to a strongly 
arguable degree” that a writing impacted the testimony of the witness). 
67.  See Bank Hapoalim, B.M. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 92 Civ. 
3561 (KMW), 1994 WL 119575, at, *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994); see also RICE 
ET AL., supra note 52, at 743-44. 
68.  See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.  
69.  See, e.g., Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 637 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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generated substantial case law as to its application.70 
To determine what “justice requires” in the case before 
them, the courts, as Rule 612’s legislative history instructs, 
balance the Rule’s goal of accurate fact finding71 against the 
prevention of time-consuming fishing expeditions at trial and 
depositions for writings that may have influenced the witness’s 
recollection.72  The factors considered include: 
 
[T]he importance of the witness’ testimony, the 
extent to which the witness apparently relied 
upon writings used to refresh memory, the extent 
to which the writings might reveal a credibility 
problem, whether credibility  could be tested 
effectively in some less burdensome way, and 
whether there is evidence of a calculated plan to 
use writings to improperly influence the 
testimony of a witness and resist production in 
order to conceal this influence [and] . . . the extent 
of the materials sought[.] [This] permit[s] the 
adverse party to exercise rights under Rule 612, 
the courts have considered the extent of the 
materials sought, whether such materials are 
privileged or attorney work product, whether 
 
70.  See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, at § 612.04(4)(b) (collecting 
cases); 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 6188 (2d ed. 2012) (collecting cases). It should be noted that 
“justice requires” replaced “in the interest of justice,” the words in Rule 612 
when originally enacted, in the course of the general “restyling” of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence that became effective December 1, 2011. See FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE REVIEW, supra note 19 (2011 Amendment to Restyle the Federal 
Rules of Evidence). No change of meaning was intended. 
71.  See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, at § 612.04(4)(b); WRIGHT & 
GOLD, supra note 70, at § 6182.  
72.  See Note, Interactions Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and 
Work Product Protection Under the Federal Rules, 88 YALE L.J. 390, 393 n.24 
(1978) (noting that the “interest of justice” standard codifies the rule of 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), that inspection and use right 
under the common law is subject to the court’s discretion to guard against 
fishing expeditions); see also In re: Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 
314 F.R.D. 397, 402 (E.D. La. 2016) (“While the purpose of Rule 612 is to aid 
the pursuit of truth by prompting the unavoidably imperfect memories of 
witnesses, courts struggle with litigants who attempt to use Rule 612 for 
purposes of discovery.”).   
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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some policy extrinsic to the evidence rules 
suggests the materials should not be disclosed, the 
probity of the adverse party’s conduct in 
connection with the requested production, and 
whether production of writings could unduly 
delay proceedings because the materials are 
difficult to assess.73 
 
Unfortunately, the courts rarely set forth the precise 
manner in which it makes its decision as to whether “justice 
requires” the production of the writing.74  An exception is the 
thoughtful decision of the Court in Barcomb v. Sabo, an excellent 
example of the application of the standard.75 Plaintiff, a state 
college police officer, commenced a federal civil rights action 
against college officials, alleging they “falsely arrested and 
maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his constitutional 
rights,” causing him to be suspended from his employment.76  At 
the deposition of a college employee (“Welch”): 
 
[S]he testified that a few months prior to the 
deposition, she and others printed all the 
electronic mail communications relevant to the 
case, sorted them into chronological order, 
reviewed them together, and [forwarded them to 
the attorney representing the defendant officials]. 
Welch [further] testified that it was “very 
possible” that the emails formed at least some of 
her current recollection of the events surrounding 
[plaintiff’s] suspension, and that after reviewing 
and printing the electronic mails, she “put [a] time 
 
73.  WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 70, at § 6185. Privilege claims will be 
discussed separately infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text. 
74.  EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: A 
STUDY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE BY THE SECTION OF LITIGATION, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 186 (David A. Schleuter & Stephen A. Saltzburg 
eds., 3d ed. 1998) (citing Smith & Wesson, Div. of Bangor Punta Corp. v. United 
States, 782 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986) and Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl O. 
Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
75.  Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV-877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009).  
76.  Id. at *1. 
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line together” which was “possib[ly]” shaped by 
the information she gathered while copying and 
correlating all of the electronic mail 
communications. Based on [her] review and her 
recollection that defendants . . . were all given the 
same packet of electronic mails to review prior to 
their depositions, [plaintiff] demand[ed their] 
production. . . pursuant to Rule 612.77 
 
The Court ordered the documents to be disclosed to Plaintiff.  
As for its rationale in so ordering, the Court initially noted that 
Welch had examined all these electronic mails while she was 
organizing them and possibly used them as a basis for both her 
current testimony and the time lines that were used during the 
course of hers and others’ depositions.  The Court concluded this 
testimony “demonstrat[ed] an [sic] a sufficient impact on witness 
testimony for both Welch and [Defendant] Sabo.”78  Additionally, 
the Court noted that it was unknown to what degree the 
electronic mail circulations impacted the testimony of the other 
employees who were present photocopying, correlating, and 
reviewing the documents prior to the depositions.79  As to this 
fact, the court commented that “[m]ass sharing of electronic mail 
communications raises a significant issue for fair and effective 
cross-examination concerning matters reviewed by a witness in 
preparation for his or her testimony.”80  Lastly, the Court 
observed that “the time lines included information about 
[Plaintiff’s present] suspension and criminal charges”—
”information [which was] directly relevant to [Plaintiff’s] theory 
of his case.”81  For these reasons, the Court held “disclosure 
under Rule 612, does not constitute a fishing expedition but a 
necessary action to ensure fairness.”82 
  
 
77.  Id. at *8 (citations omitted). 
78.  Id. at *9. 
79.  Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV-877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878, *9 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009). 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV-877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878, at 
*9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009).  
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 F. Privilege and Work-Product Claims 
 
A writing subject to automatic or discretionary production 
may be protected from disclosure by the attorney-client 
privilege83 or as work product.84  A “tension” or “conflict” has 
been recognized between the production directive of Rule 612 
and the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and 
the work-product doctrine.85  The issue presented is whether 
Rule 612 production right overrides the privilege protections. 
When a writing is used to refresh a witness’s recollection 
while testifying, and thus subject to automatic production, the 
 
83.  The attorney-client privilege, as governed by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501, protects against disclosure of confidential communications 
between attorneys and their clients.  See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 
524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).  It is “intended to encourage ‘full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of 
justice.’” Id. at 403 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 
(1981)).  While the reported decisions involve the attorney-client privilege, 
other privileges can also be invoked, and will be treated similar to attorney-
client privilege claims.  See Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 
637 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (physician-patient privilege); Audiotext Commc’ns 
Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1996) (“any 
privilege”).  
84.  The work-product doctrine is defined as the “protection that 
applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.” FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2). Work-
production protection encompasses both advisory work-product, such as 
diagrams, photographs and reports prepared by or for any attorney and opinion 
work-product, including the opinions, strategies, or mental impressions of an 
attorney, so called core work-product.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2000). However, under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii), ordinary work-product is generally immune from 
discovery unless the party seeking disclosure “has substantial need for the 
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their 
substantial equivalent by other means.”  Under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) 
opinion work-product is immune from disclosure.  See Appleton Papers, Inc. v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 702 F.3d 1018, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 2012). FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(3)(A)-(B) is, in essence, a codification of the holdings of Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the seminal work-product decision, which holdings 
were justified by the Supreme Court upon several policies, including the 
prevention of ill-prepared opposing counsel from piggy-backing on the effort 
put forth by a more diligent attorney on the other side.  Id. at 510-11.   
85.  See In re: Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 314 F.R.D. 397, 
400-01 (E.D. La. 2016) (“conflict”); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1358(SAS), 2012 WL 2044432, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 6, 2012) (“tension”). 
23
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courts have uniformly held that the protections against 
disclosure afforded by the attorney-client privilege86 and the 
work product doctrine are lost.87  As to the latter, the loss of 
protection may extend to core attorney opinion work product.88  
As stated in a leading treatise: “There is little doubt that using 
documents to refresh memory on the witness stand waives or 
defeats a claim of attorney-client privilege by the calling party 
or a claim of work product protection by the lawyer.”89  The basis 
for this conclusion, as expressed by the courts, is that the right 
of inspection and use recognized by Rule 612 with respect to a 
writing used while the witness is testifying is absolute.90 
However, when a document protected by the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product doctrine is used to refresh a witness’s 
recollection before testifying at a trial or a deposition, and thus 
subject to a discretionary production, the courts are in wide 
disagreement on whether the protection is lost by such use.  
Various approaches to resolution of this issue have been taken.91 
Several courts take the position that neither the attorney-
client privilege nor work-product doctrine apply as a bar to 
production of an otherwise protected writing.92  The apparent 
 
86.  See, e.g., Beattie v. CenturyTel., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Mich. 
2009); Jolly v. Coughlin, No. 92 Civ. 9026 (JGK), 1995 WL 495641, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1995); United States v. Finkielstain, 718 F. Supp. 1187, 
1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 409 
(W.D. Pa. 1984).   
87.  See, e.g., Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1982); Sperling 
v. City of Kennesaw Police Dep’t, 202 F.R.D. 325, 328 (N.D. Ga. 2001); S & A 
Painting Co., 103 F.R.D. at 409.  
88.  See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616-17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
89.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, at 601. 
90.  Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“[B]eing phrased in mandatory language, Rule 612(1) prevails when 
pitted against a claim of privilege.”). 
91.  See generally In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 241, 
243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing three different approaches taken by the 
courts to resolve the issue); Barrer v. Women’s Nat’l. Bank, 96 F.R.D. 202, 204 
(D.D.C. 1982) (noting the conflicting case law on interaction of Rule 612 and 
claims of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection). 
92.  See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(attorney-client privilege and work-product); United States v. 22.80 Acres of 
Land, 107 F.R.D. 20, 25 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (attorney-client privilege and work-
product); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982) 
(work-product); Marshall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 
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basis of these decisions is that it is always necessary in the 
interest of justice to have disclosure of documents used before 
testifying.93  This approach has been the subject of criticism in 
the courts, with courts opining that such approach is 
“inconsistent with the advisory committee note indicting that 
Rule 612 does not bar the assertion of privilege [protection,]”94 
and that it eliminates judicial discretion when Congress 
intended discretion to be exercised in all before testifying 
situations.95 
At the other extreme, a few courts have concluded that 
production of the writing protected by the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product doctrine can only be ordered if the 
protection has been waived by actions other than its use for 
refreshment purposes.96  This approach was explained by one 
court as follows: 
 
[T]he relevant inquiry is not simply whether the 
documents were used to refresh the witness’s 
recollection, but rather whether the documents 
were used in a manner which waived the attorney-
client privilege. This could happen, for example, if 
privileged communications were disclosed to an 
individual outside the privileged relationship. On 
the other hand, the privilege would not be lost if 






1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 
8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Berkey Photo, Inc., 74 F.R.D. at 616 (suggesting Rule 612 
left privileges generally untouched).   
93.  Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D. Mass. 1988).   
94.  In re Rivastigmine, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
95.  See Derderian, 121 F.R.D. at 16.  
96.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, at 601. 
97.  Suss v. MSX Int’l. Eng’g Servs., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (citations omitted) (attorney-client privilege); see also In re Managed 
Care Litig., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (attorney-client 
privilege and work-product); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Cont’l 
Airlines, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 738, 744 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (deliberative privilege). 
25
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Criticism of this approach has been expressed by a court as 
follows: 
 
However, there may well be instances where it is 
“necessary in the interest of justice” to require the 
production of a document as to which the privilege 
has not been waived in order to permit adequate 
cross-examination. For example, someone within 
the privileged relationship may be shown a 
document that he has never seen before in order 
to refresh his recollection, and it would be 
prejudicial to the party taking the deposition to be 
denied access to the document.98 
 
A third approach, termed the “functional analysis” test, has 
been adopted by a substantial number of federal courts.99  This 
approach has been described as “better reasoned” then the other 
two above stated approaches.100  Under this approach, the 
protections afforded to witnesses protected by the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine are to be taken into 
account in the balancing approach, which is made under the 
“justice requires”/”interests of justice” standard,101 and are 
significant factors to be considered.102  In this regard, the 
interests of the party resisting production in protecting its 
confidential information in the writing balance against the need 
of the party seeking production to see the writing so as to test 
the witness’s credibility.103  Under this approach the “justice 
requires”/”interests of justice” standard may sometimes, 
depending upon the given circumstances, require the production 
of a writing as to which its protections under the attorney-client 
 
98.  In re Rivastigmine, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 243.   
99.  Id. 
100.  See, e.g., Calandra v. Sodexho, Inc., No. 3:06CV49 (WWE), 2007 WL 
1245317, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2007); In re Rivastigmine, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 
243; Bank Hapoalim, B.M. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 92 Civ. 3561 
(KMW), 1994 WL 119575, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994). 
101.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. RLJ Lodging Trust, No. 13-cv-00758, 2014 
WL 3830545, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2014). 
102.  See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
103.  See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
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privilege or work-product doctrine has not been waived104 and 
other times require denial of production.105 
The court in Baker v. CAN Ins. Co. added another factor to 
be considered when attorney-client privilege and work-product 
doctrine protections are invoked.106  There, the Court held that 
production of a writing is only required “where the witness, after 
having refreshed his recollection with the contested material, 
discloses a significant portion of the substance of that 
material.”107  This holding, properly interpreted, requires a 
comparison of the documents reviewed with the witness’s 
testimony.  Disclosure will be required if a significant part of the 
testimony overlaps with the content of the documents reviewed.  
It has been criticized as follows: 
 
This interpretation is unfair to the party 
refreshing the witness’s recollection, however, 
because portions of any document may 
fortuitously overlap with the substance of the 
witness’s testimony but not have been used by the 
witness to refresh his recollection. As a 
consequence, the second interpretation 
potentially requires the production of a broad 
range of confidential materials that have no 
relevance to the quality of the witness’s 
recollection. Thus, this standard is flawed on both 
counts – it either fails to address the adversarial 
need presented by the use of the materials or is 
unfair to the party calling the witness because the 
disclosure it compels is disproportionate to the 
need created.108 
 
104.  See, e.g., Server Tech., Inc. v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., No. 3:06-
CV-006980-LRH, 2011 WL 1447620, at *10 (D. Nev. Apr. 14, 2011) (attorney-
client privilege); Lawson v. United States, No. 97CIV.9239(AJP)(JSM), 1998 
WL 312239, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1998) (work-product). 
105.  See, e.g., Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 
468-70 (D. Md. 1998); Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13, 16-17 (D. 
Mass. 1988); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 119 F.R.D. 4, 5 (E.D.N.Y 
& S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
106.  Baker v. CNA Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 322 (D. Mont. 1988). 
107.  Id. at 327. 
108.  RICE ET AL., supra note 52, at 270. 
27
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Two discernable trends in applying this functional analysis 
are present.  One trend is to deny production when the writing 
would disclose an attorney’s “mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories,” core opinion work product which is 
specifically protected from disclosure by F.R.C.P. 26(b)(3)(B).109  
The other trend is to order production of a writing, otherwise 
protectable, excepting core opinion work product, when there is 
evidence of improper witness “coaching.”110 
A recent decision from the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals, In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., must be noted as it 
expressed concern about the application of the functional 
analysis standard in the context of a business’s internal 
investigation led by company attorneys.111  In a qui tam action 
under the Federal False Claims Act against Kellogg Brown & 
Root, Inc. (“KBR”), a federal defense contractor, Plaintiff-Realtor 
Barker alleged that KBR defrauded the U.S. Government by 
inflating costs and accepting kickbacks.112  At issue was whether 
KBR must disclose documents related to its internal 
investigation concerning the underlying allegations that KBR 
conducted pursuant to its Code of Business Conduct, which was 
overseen by the company’s Law Department.113  The argument 
for disclosure was that prior to a deposition noticed to cover the 
KBR’s investigation, KBR’s designated employee for the 
deposition reviewed the internal investigation documents 
available, a review that triggered their production under Rule 
 
109.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); See, e.g., Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV-
877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009); Napolitano 
v. Omaha Airport Auth., No. 8:08CV299, 2009 WL 1393392, at *3-4 (D. Neb. 
May 11, 2009); Lebow v. Meredith Corp., No. 05-2545-JWL, 2007 WL 1343744, 
at *1-2 (D. Kan. May 4, 2007); Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 472-75; In re Comair 
Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. 350, 353-54 (E.D. Ky. 1983). 
110.  See, e.g., Donjon Marine Co., v. Buchanan Marine, L.P., CIV. No. 
3:09CV1005 (WWE), 2010 WL 2977044, at *2 (D. Conn. July 21, 2010); Parry 
v. Highlight Indus., Inc., 125 F.R.D. 449, 452 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Derderian, 
121 F.R.D. at 16-17; Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983) 
(ordering production because “immunized materials should not remain 
undiscoverable after they have been used to influence and shape testimony.” 
(citation omitted)). 
111.  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
112.  Id. at 140. 
113.  Id. 
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612.114  The District Court ordered production.115  Concluding the 
documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege and 
the work-product doctrine, the Circuit Court concluded that 
their production could not be ordered pursuant to Rule 612, and 
reversed the District Court.116  The basis for its ruling was that 
the balancing standard could not be used in the circumstances 
to obtain the documents.117  It noted that production could not 
be ordered where, as here, the party seeking production caused 
the protected documents to be reviewed by placing them in issue 
at the deposition.118  In this connection, the Court commented: 
“[a]llowing privilege and protection to be so easily defeated 
would defy ‘reason and experience,’ and ‘potentially upend 
certain settled understandings and practices’ about the 
protections for such investigations.”119 
 
 G. Scope of Production 
 
Once a court determines that production is appropriate, the 
entire writing is not produced.  Rather, as directed by Rule 
612(b), the court upon request must limit disclosure to that 
portion of the writing used for refreshing recollection purposes 
which “relates to” the witness’s testimony as refreshed.120  Thus, 
unexamined parts or parts that were looked at but not relied 
upon should be redacted from the portion prior to its 
production.121  Such redaction should be done by the court at an 
 
114.  Id. at 143. 
115.  United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., 75 F. Supp. 3d 532 
(D.D.C. 2014), vacated, In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d at 152. 
116.  Id. at 149. 
117.  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d at 144-45. 
118.  Id. at 144 (“To prepare adequately for the deposition, [the employee] 
had no choice but to review documents related to the . . . investigation.”). 
119.  Id. at 145 (citations omitted). 
120.  S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 410 (W.D. Pa. 
1984) (“‘testimony’ should be interpreted to mean only testimony which was 
refreshed by the writing . . . [to] prevent[] the unfairness which would result 
from broad disclosure merely because other parts of the writing, not used to 
refresh recollection, may coincide with other parts of the deponent’s or 
witness’s testimony.”); see also United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1540 
(8th Cir. 1995).   
121.  See, e.g., United States v. Howton, 688 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Hollister Inc. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 84 C 1987, 1988 WL 129988, at 
29
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in camera review.122 
 
III. New York’s Refreshing Recollection Doctrine as Developed 
and Applied to Testifying Witnesses 
 
 A. Introduction 
 
Unlike the doctrine in the federal courts, the refreshing 
recollection doctrine in New York has been developed entirely by 
the courts through its power to develop and formulate a common 
law of evidence.123  This development has largely been achieved 
by Court of Appeals rulings, with numerous decisions from the 
Appellate Division Departments applying those rulings to fill in 
the proverbial gaps created by them.  Notably, this development 
by the Court of Appeals has been achieved exclusively in the 
context of witnesses testifying at the trial level.  It has not 
addressed issues such as whether the doctrine applies to 
witnesses testifying at a deposition or whether the doctrine 
applies to a witness before testifying at a trial or deposition. 
The basics of this doctrine, i.e., when a writing or object can 
be used to refresh the recollection of a witness while testifying, 
the mechanics of how it is done, and the right of the opposing 
party to inspect and use the material used will be addressed in 
Part B.  Part B will also explore the application of these two 
aspects of the doctrine to a witness testifying at a deposition.  
Part C will address when, if ever, a claim of privilege can defeat 
the production right granted by the doctrine, an issue on which 




*1 (N.D. Ill. Dec 1, 1988).  
122.  See Smith & Wesson, Div. of Bangor Punta Corp. v. United States, 
782 F.2d 1074, 1083 (1st Cir. 1986). 
123.  People v. Conyers, 420 N.E.2d 933, 936 (N.Y. 1981) (“our judicial 
responsibility . . . to protect the integrity of the truth-finding process”); Fleury 
v. Edwards, 200 N.E.2d 550, 554 (N.Y. 1964) (Fuld, J., concurring) (“The 
common law of evidence is constantly being refashioned by the courts of this 
and other jurisdictions to meet the demands of modern litigation.  . . .  Absent 
some strong public policy or a clear act of pre-emption by the Legislature, rules 
of evidence should be fashioned to further, not frustrate, the truth-finding 
function of the courts in civil cases.”). 
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 B. Refreshing Recollection Doctrine 
 
     1. Basics 
 
In New York, it has long been established that, in both civil 
and criminal trial practice, an examining attorney may seek to 
refresh the recollection of a witness during examination when 
the witness exhibits difficulty recalling facts once known.124  In 
the first reported decision invoking this rule, Lawrence v. 
Barker,125 the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York in 1830 
concisely stated: “The rule is that a written memorandum may 
be referred to by a witness to refresh his memory. . . .”126  When 
the witness’s memory is refreshed, the witness thereon testifies 
from his or her independent recollection.  The writing is not 
admitted, as the witness’s testimony as refreshed is the evidence 
and not the writing.127 
The emergence of the refreshing recollection rule in New 
York was the result of judicial recognition of its necessity as 
otherwise a “party’s rights [would be] dependent upon unusual 
strength of memory.”128  The rule was also supported by English 
common law cases, cited by the New York courts, which 
recognized the rule is based upon an accepted theory that certain 
matters, acting as stimuli, brought to the witness’s attention can 
start a chain of associations which prompts the witness to recall 
that forgotten matter.129 
 
124.  See discussions in 5 ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, 
EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 6:80 (2d ed. 2011); 
RICHARD T. FARRELL , PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 6-213 (11th ed. 
1995); EDITH L. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 332 (2d ed. 1977); 2 
ROLAND FORD, NEW YORK LAW OF EVIDENCE § 211 (1935); MICHAEL M. MARTIN 
ET AL, NEW YORK EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 6.13 (2d ed. 2003).  
125.  Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1830).  
126.  Id. at 305. 
127.  See Howard v. McDonough, 77 N.Y. 592, 593-94 (1879); Marcly v. 
Shults, 29 N.Y. 346, 351 (1864); People v. Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d 298, 307 (App. 
Div. 1961).  See also BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 51. 
128.  Wise v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn, 4 N.E. 634, 634 (N.Y. 
1886); see also Howard,  
77 N.Y. at 594. 
129.  See, e.g., 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 758, at 127 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1970) (citing Lawes v. Reed, 2 
Lewin 152, 153 (1835)).  See also Dillard S. Gardner, Perception and Memory 
31
HUTTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/18  2:00 PM 
468 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38.2 
While the Rule in New York had its roots in written 
memorandum prepared by the witness, that limitation was 
rejected by the Court of Appeals in 1852 in Huff v. Bennett.130  
The Court stated: 
 
Although the rule is that a witness in general can 
testify only to such facts as are within his own 
knowledge and recollection, yet it is well settled 
that he is permitted to assist his memory by the 
use of any written instrument, memorandum or 
entry in a book, and it is not necessary that such 
writing should have been made by the witness 
himself, or that it should be an original writing, 
provided after inspecting it he can speak to the 
facts from his own recollection.131 
 
Consistent with Huff, subsequent judicial decisions have 
approved the use of virtually any sort of writing.132  Decisions 
also recognized that the rule was not limited to the use of writing 
as the refreshing mechanism, permitting, for example, the use 
of sound recordings.133  Although no New York case can be found 
on point, it is likely as well that the courts would even approve 
“a song, a scent, a photograph, and allusion. . . .”134  What 
matters, in sum, is whether the writing or item used to refresh 
recollection actually serves that purpose and not the document 
 
of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 392 (1933); Robert M. Hutchins & 
Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence—Memory, 41 
HARV. L. REV. 860, 861-62 (1928).  
130.  Huff v. Bennett, 6 N.Y. 337 (1852).  
131.  Id. at 339. 
132.  See FISCH, supra note 124, at 216-17; MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, 
at 545 (collecting cases and noting “[t]here is no limit on the sort of writing 
that may be used to stimulate memory . . . “). 
133.  See Seaberg v. N. Shore Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 925 N.Y.S.2d 669, 
672 (App. Div. 2011); People v. Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d 298, 307 (App. Div. 1961).  
134.  FISCH, supra note 124, at 217 (citing United States v. Rappy, 157 
F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1947)); see also Fanelli 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 141 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944) (“The creaking of a hinge, 
the whistling of a tune, the smell of seaweed, the sight of an old photograph, 
the taste of nutmeg, the touch of a piece of canvas, may bring vividly to the 
foreground a consciousness the recollection of events that happened years ago 
and which would otherwise have been forgotten.”).  
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or item used to refresh the recollection.135 
The only prerequisite for the invoking of the rule is a 
showing that the witness’s memory is “exhausted.”136  This 
requirement of exhaustion is liberally construed as the courts 
deem it permissible to seek to refresh the witness’s recollection 
merely upon the witness’s response of “I do not recall” or “I 
cannot remember” to a question.137 
This view is confirmed by the Court of Appeals decision in 
People v. Oddone where it permitted refreshment upon the fact 
the witness’s testimony was equivocal.138  In this case, 
Defendant was charged with murder, based upon an allegedly 
excessive headlock on the victim, whom he was trying to subdue.  
When a defense witness was questioned regarding the time 
frame, the witness replied “I wasn’t keeping track of time. But it 
could have been a minute or so. I don’t know.”139  Defense counsel 
sought to refresh her recollection by showing the witness her 
prior statement in which she said the time frame was “maybe 6 
to 10 seconds.”140  The trial court refused to permit the defense 
counsel to do so, stating that the witness had “given no 
indication she needs her memory refreshed.”141  The Court held 
the trial court erred and refreshing recollection should have 
been permitted because the witness’s responses indicated, albeit 
indirectly, that she had perceived the event and had some 
memory of it.142  Properly read, Oddone shows the “exhaustion” 
requirement should be liberally construed, and not strictly 
applied, lest relevant evidence is kept from the jury.143 
 
 
135.  See Baker v. State, 371 A.2d 699, 705 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) 
(referring to the common law rule in the United States, “[a]ll that is required 
is that [the object] may trigger the Proustian moment.”). 
136.  Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 307; Sofranski Bros., Inc., v. H. C. F. Koch & 
Co., 147 N.Y.S. 1142, 1143 (App. Term 1914) (per curiam). 
137.  See Cohen v. Sun Ins. Off., 91 N.E. 265, 265-66 (N.Y. 1910); Nappi 
v. Gerdts, 477 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (App. Div. 1984). 
138.  People v. Oddone, 3 N.E.3d 1160, 1164 (N.Y. 2013).   
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. (“[T]he inference that her recollection could benefit from being 
refreshed is a compelling one.”). 
143.  See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 124, at 640.  
33
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However, where the witness professes no lack of memory, 
the rule cannot be invoked.144  For example, in People v. Boice, a 
prosecution for criminally negligent homicide arising out of the 
death of a pedestrian struck by a motorcycle driven by 
Defendant, the trial court permitted the prosecution to refresh 
the recollection of an eyewitness to the accident called on the 
People’s direct case.145  The witness “had unequivocally testified 
at trial that she believed the motorcycle to be travelling between 
30 and 45 miles per hour,” and the Prosecutor sought to refresh 
her recollection of the speed by showing her a copy of her prior 
grand jury testimony at which she testified to a higher speed.146  
The Appellate Court held the trial court erred because the 
witness’s testimony showed that, “there was no need to have her 
memory refreshed.”147  Likewise in Berkowsky v. New York City 
Ry. Co., a wrongful death action arising out of Plaintiff’s 
decedent’s fall from a platform of one of Defendant’s cars, the 
trial court was found to have committed error when it permitted 
the Plaintiff to refresh the recollection of a police officer who was 
an eyewitness to the accident.148  The police officer, called by the 
Plaintiff, testified that he saw decedent fall from the platform 
before it stopped, testimony which was contrary to what he had 
written in a memorandum after the accident.149 Despite his 
repeated and persistent statements that his memory was clear 
and needed no refreshing, Plaintiff was permitted to try to 
refresh the witness’s recollection by reading to him his 
memorandum in the presence of the jury.150  Among other errors 
committed by the trial court in allowing such refreshment, the 
Appellate Court held error was present because the witness 
insisted that his memory needed no refreshing.151 
 
 
144.  See, e.g., People v. Ballard, 607 N.Y.S.2d 816, 816 (App. Div. 1985); 
People v. Fross, 496 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (App. Div. 1985); People v. Boice, 455 
N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (App. Div. 1982); Munro Athletic Prods. Co. v. Universal 
Carloading & Distrib. Co., 53 N.Y.S.2d 170, 170 (App. Term 1944).  
145.  Boice, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
146.  Id. at 860.  
147.  Id. 
148.  Berkowsky v. N.Y.C. Ry. Co., 111 N.Y.S. 989 (App. Div. 1908). 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. 
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The trial court retains discretion to control the refreshing 
recollection process.152  This discretion is to be exercised in 
determining whether the witness’s recollection has in fact been 
refreshed, and the witness is not just relating what he or she just 
read.153  The concern was expressed by one court as follows:  
“There is danger in allowing a witness to refresh his memory by 
a statement because he may not remember the facts in issue but 
may very well testify to what he reads in the statement.”154  
Additionally, the trial court must ensure that the contents of a 
document being used by the examining attorney to refresh a 
witness’s recollection are not disclosed to the jury as “it is not 
proper under the guise of refreshing the recollection of [a 
witness] to place before a jury matter or documents otherwise 
inadmissible.”155 
While the refreshing recollection rule has its roots in the 
examination of a witness at trial, it should also be applicable at 
a deposition when the witness-deponent is having difficulty in 
recalling a relevant fact.156  The reason is that since the risk of a 
witness’s memory loss is precisely the same whether the witness 
is testifying at a trial or at a deposition, there is no principled 
reason to not apply the rule in both situations.  This is especially 
true when one considers the distinct possibility the witness’s 
deposition will become admissible at trial as trial evidence as 
permitted by C.P.L.R. 3117.157  In fact, it can be compellingly 
argued that the Legislature has so provided as C.P.L.R. 3113(c) 
which governs depositions, provides in pertinent part that 
“[e]xamination and cross-examination of deponents shall 
 
152.  See People v. Sexton, 80 N.E. 396, 401 (N.Y. 1907); People v. Di 
Loretto, 541 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261-62 (App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 543 N.E.2d 
756 (N.Y. 1989). 
153.  BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 124, at 642 (“Courts also perform 
a supervisory role to assure that the witness really has an independent 
recollection and that the material is being used merely to refresh that 
recollection.”). 
154.  Brown v. W. Union Tel. Co., 274 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56 (App. Div. 1966).  
155.  People v. Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d 298, 307 (App. Div. 1961).   
156.  The Court of Appeals has not addressed this issue.  At least one 
decision has recognized, albeit indirectly, that the refreshing recollection 
process is applicable at a deposition.  See McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
33, 34 (App. Div. 1997).  
157.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3117 (McKinney 2016). 
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proceed as permitted in the trial of actions in open court . . . .”158  
In Thompson v. Mather, the Court, citing to C.P.L.R. 3113(c), 
held that the well-settled rule that an attorney for a non-party 
witness had no right to object during or participate in the trial 
at which the witness was called to testify was equally applicable 
to the attorney for a non-party witness at a deposition.159  
Although the specific holding of Thompson has been legislatively 
overruled by an amendment to C.P.L.R. 3113(c),160 it 
nonetheless supports the application of the trial refreshing 
recollection rule to a deposition.161 
Overall, it is appropriate to view New York’s refreshing 
recollection rule as applicable to all testifying witnesses, 
whether testifying at trial or deposition.  Succinctly stated, this 
rule provides that if a witness at a trial or deposition has 
personal knowledge of a relevant fact but while testifying at the 
trial or deposition has difficulty in recalling it, the witness may 
use any writing or object, without restriction as to authorship, 
guaranty of accuracy or time of making, to stimulate his or her 
recollection, and may thereafter testify to the fact from his or her 
own memory.  As so stated, New York’s rule is consistent with 
the refreshing recollection rule recognized in the federal 
courts162 and all other state courts.163 
 
 C. Right of Inspection of the Writing or Object Used for 
Refreshing Recollection 
 
New York law has also long recognized as an important 
component of the refreshing recollection doctrine that the 
opposing party has the right to inspect the writing or object used 
for refreshing recollection purposes at the trial or deposition, 
 
158.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3113(c) (McKinney 2014). 
159.  Thompson v. Mather, 894 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (App. Div. 2010).   
160.  Act of Sept. 23, 2014, ch. 379, § 1, 2014 N.Y. Laws 379 (amending 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3113(c) (McKinney 2014)). 
161.   Of note, this argument based on C.P.L.R. 3113(c) is fully consistent 
with the federal court decisions applying FED. R. EVID. 612 to deposition 
testimony by reason of FED.  R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1).  See supra notes 35-37 and 
accompanying text.  
162.  See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.  
163.  FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 6, § 32.7 (reviewing state evidence 
codes). 
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and then to use the writing or object on cross-examination for 
impeachment purposes.164  This inspection and use right is 
derived from early English common law cases as a means to 
preclude perjured testimony.165  As stated by a New York court 
in 1870: 
 
The right of a party to protection against the 
introduction against him of false, forged or 
manufactured evidence, which he is not permitted 
to inspect, must not be invaded a hair’s breadth.  
It is too valuable to be trifled with, or to permit 
the court to enter into any calculation as to how 
far it may be encroached upon without injury to 
the party.166 
 
The cross-examination permitted gives the opposing party 
the opportunity to determine through the use of the writing or 
object whether the witness’s testimony is actually the product of 
a revived recollection or merely a recitation of the facts 
contained in the writing, the essence of “manufactured 
evidence.”167  Only those parts of the writing or object that relate 
to the witness’s testimony may be used for cross-examination 
and admitted into evidence.168  A failure to permit such use will 
constitute error.169 
 
164.  See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 124, at 643; FISCH, supra note 
124, at 217-18; MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 547; FARRELL, supra note 124, 
at 365. A writing used may be admitted for substantive purposes if a hearsay 
exception, such as the past recollection recorded exception, encompasses it.  See 
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 546-47.   
165.  See WIGMORE, supra note 129, at 136, citing Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1 
Car. & P. 582 (1824); Gregory v. Taversen, 6 Car. & P. 281 (1833); Palmer v. 
McLean, 1 Sw. & Tr. 149 (1858).  
166.  Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1870).  The 
Court of Appeals endorsed this view of the inspection right Tibbetts recognized 
in People v. Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d 380, 393-94 (N.Y. 1954).  
167.  See Peck v. Valentine, 94 N.Y. 569, 571 (N.Y. 1884); Schwickert v. 
Levin, 78 N.Y.S. 394, 395-96 (App. Div. 1902).  See also BROUN ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 55 (“With the memorandum in hand, the cross-examiner has a good 
opportunity to test the credibility of the witness’s claim that her memory has 
been revived, and to search out any discrepancies between the writing and the 
testimony.”).  
168.  See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 647. 
169.  See Caupain v. Johnson, 247 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (App. Div. 1964) 
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Notably, this inspection right provides the opposing party 
with an absolute entitlement to inspect any writing or object 
used during a trial or deposition.170  There are no qualifications 
imposed on this right, and this right is not subject to the exercise 
of judicial discretion.171  Furthermore, as this right is “too 
valuable to be trifled with,”172 a denial of the right may not be 
subject to a harmless error analysis.173 
New York’s inspection and use right as to writings used by 
witnesses while testifying is consistent with the mandatory and 
unconditional production rule followed in the federal courts 
pursuant to F.R.E. 612(b)174 and its state counterparts.175  The 
only difference is that New York’s right is recognized under the 
common law while in all other jurisdictions it is recognized by 
legislative enactment. 
 
D. Use of Privileged Matter 
 
When the right of inspection is triggered, just as what occurs 
under Rule 612, an issue will arise when the party in possession 
of the writing claims that inspection and use of it at trial on 
cross-examination pursuant to that right is barred because the 
document contains materials which are protected from 
disclosure under other provisions of New York law.176  The 
sources of such protection are the statutory testimonial 
privileges set forth in Article 45 of the Civil Practice Law and 
Rules, most commonly the attorney-client privilege,177 and the 
 
(“Trial Court erred in refusing to permit in evidence, when offered by 
defendant, a report used by one of plaintiffs’ witnesses to refresh his 
recollection. That report, made by a third party, was admissible on the question 
of the credibility of the witness.”) (citations omitted). 
170.  People v. Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d 380, 383 (N.Y. 1954).  See also People v. 
Brown, 153 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1956). 
171.  See People v. Woodrow, 238 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (App. Div. 1963); 
Miller v. Greenwald Petticoat Co., 183 N.Y.S. 97, 99 (App. Div. 1920).  
172.   Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1870)  
173.  See Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d at 383; Schwickert v. Levin, 78 N.Y.S. 394, 
395-96 (App. Div. 1902). 
174.  See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.  
175.  See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 6, § 32:7 (reviewing state 
evidence codes). 
176.  See supra notes 91-119 and accompanying text. 
177.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503(a) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2017).  The attorney 
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New York’s work-product doctrine, consisting of the attorney 
work-product privilege178 and the material prepared for 
litigation privilege.179  The issue presented is whether the 
refreshing recollection doctrine’s inspection right overrides any 
such privilege claim based upon these sources. 
Unlike in the federal courts where this same issue has been 
resolved in favor of disclosure through interpretation of the 
mandatory language of Rule 612 and its underlying legislative 
history,180 resolution of this issue in New York will be made 
strictly under the common law.  Rules of statutory 
interpretation, in other words, have no rule in determining the 
issue in New York, and the principles of the common law will 
instead play a prominent role.  Nonetheless, the federal 
decisions can form a backdrop to the issue here in New York due 
to the fact that New York’s right of inspection and privileges are 
similar to the federal right of inspection and federal privileges. 
Initially, it must be noted that this issue has not been 
addressed by the Court of Appeals in any of its seminal decisions 
adopting and applying the refreshing recollection doctrine’s 
 
client privilege protects confidential communication between the client and the 
client’s attorney, including the client’s and attorney’s agents, permitting when 
invoked the client to refuse to disclose the communication and to prevent any 
other privileged person from disclosing the communication.  See generally 
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 5.2.1-5.2.7.   
178.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(c) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2017).  This section, 
captioned “Attorney’s Work Product,” provides: “The work product of an 
attorney shall not be obtainable.” Id. The New York courts follow the definition 
of attorney work product set forth in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 
(1947), holding that it embraces such items as “interviews, statements, 
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs,” 
conducted, prepared of held by the attorney.  See Kenford Co. v. Cty of Erie, 
390 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (App. Div. 1977) (referring to attorney work-product as 
a privilege).   
179.   N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(2) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2017).  This 
section, captioned “Materials” provides in pertinent part that “[M]aterials 
otherwise discoverable . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . . 
may be obtained only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has 
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable 
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials 
by other means.” Id. It encompasses, as the statute states, any matter prepared 
in anticipation of litigation, excepting only materials that are deemed attorney 
work product.  Id.  It creates, in essence, a “conditional privilege.”  Beach v. 
Touradji Cap. Mgmt., LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d 666, 670 (App. Div. 2012). See DAVID 
D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 348 (5th ed. 2011).  
180.  See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.  
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inspection right.181  A decision from the Appellate Division First 
Department, McDonough v. Pinsley,182 has held that when a 
witness uses a writing to refresh recollection while testifying at 
a deposition, any privilege protecting that writing from 
disclosure is waived by such use, observing that the opposing 
party “is entitled to inspect the entire document.”183  However, 
there is no analysis of the issue of waiver versus disclosure and 
the only decision the Court cited in support of its holding 
involved the use of a claimed privileged writing used to refresh 
the recollection of a witness before the witness’s deposition.184  
Decisions from the trial courts are similarly sparse, lack any 
precedential value, and reach conflicting conclusions.185 Only 
one referred to the underlying conflicting policies, concluding 
that “[i]t is this court’s opinion that an adversary’s right to 
examine writings used to refresh memory must be limited by the 
greater sanctity accorded confidential communications between 
attorney and client.”186 
It is appropriate to start analysis by first looking at the 
nature of the protection given against disclosure by these 
privileges under New York law.  As to the attorney-client 
privilege, the Court of Appeals has held that it is not necessarily 
absolute in the sense that it must always preclude disclosure of 
the underlying privilege communication once its stated 
requirements are met.187  Rather, the Court has observed, the 
 
181.  See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text. The writings used 
for refreshing recollection purposes in these cases were non-privileged.   
182.  McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1997).  
183.  Id. at 34. 
184.  Id. (citing Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 
1987)). 
185.  See Falk v. Kalt, 253 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (disclosure was 
barred as the papers were protected by the attorney-client privilege); E.R. 
Carpenter Co. v. ABC Carpet Co., 415 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (Civ. Ct. 1979) 
(privilege claim cannot bar disclosure).   
186.  Falk, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 189 (citing In re Van Gorder’s Will, 176 
N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sur. Ct. 1957). 
187.  See Priest v. Hennessy, 409 N.E.2d 983, 985-86 (N.Y. 1980) (“The 
privilege, however, is not limitless.  It has long been recognized that ‘the 
attorney-client privilege constitutes an “obstacle” to the truth-finding process, 
the invocation of which should be cautiously observed to ensure that its 
application is consistent with its purpose.’”) (quoting In re Jacqueline F. v. 
Segal, 391 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1979)); see also MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, 
§ 5.2.8  (“Notwithstanding the desirable purposes of the privileges, the courts 
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privilege must “yield in a proper case, where strong public policy 
requires disclosure.”188  The Court has also recognized various 
situations where the privilege must yield either because the 
privilege holder has engaged in conduct involving the 
confidential communication which is inconsistent with the 
privilege’s confidentiality requirement, such as a disclosure of 
the communication to a third party,189 or other policy concerns 
unrelated to protecting against disclosure, such as furthering 
criminal activity,190 which situations provide a compelling basis 
to preclude application of the privilege. 
With respect to the work-product privileges, the courts have 
uniformly held that as to a writing protected as attorney work-
product, the privilege granted is “absolute and unqualified.”191  
The basis for this absolute protection is the strong public policy 
for providing protection in litigation against disclosure to an 
adverse party in litigation.192  On the other hand, the materials 
prepared for litigation privilege is a “qualified” privilege.193  The 
reason for this treatment is that C.P.L.R. 3101(d) requires 
disclosure when a “court finds that [the covered material] can no 
longer be duplicated and that denying disclosure will result in 
‘injustice or undue hardship.’”194 
Turning now to the right of inspection and use of the writing 
or object used to refresh the witness’s recollection, it is largely 
premised upon the judicially expressed view that inspection and 
the potential for inspection of the refreshing tool will help 
 
apply it cautiously because it impedes the truth-finding process.”).  
188.  Priest, 409 N.E.2d at 986 (citing Jacqueline F. v. Segal, 391 N.E.2d 
967, 986 (N.Y. 1979)).  
189.  MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 294-99 (waiver situations). 
190.  Id. at 328-33 (exceptions). 
191.  See, e.g., Gama Aviation Inc. v. Sandton Cap. Partners, L.P., 951 
N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (App. Div. 2012) (“attorney work product . . . is subject to an 
absolute privilege.”); Beach v. Touradji Cap. Mgmt. LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d. 666, 670 
(App. Div. 2012); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enter., Inc., 499 N.Y.S.2d 560, 560 
(App. Div. 1986) (“absolute privilege”); Kenford v. Cty of Erie, 390 N.Y.S.2d 
715, 718 (App. Div. 1977) (“unqualified privilege”). 
192.  Beasock, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 
495, 510-11 (1947)). 
193.  See Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 670; Kenford, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 718; see 
also 4 THOMSON REUTERS, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS 
§ 45:29 (Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed. 2015). 
194.  Kenford, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d) 
(McKinney 2014)). 
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protect against the introduction of “false, forged or 
manufactured evidence . . . .”195  Such purpose is so important 
that it would be entirely inappropriate “to permit the court to 
enter into any calculation as to how far it may be encroached 
upon without injury to the party.”196 
Balancing the interests sought to be protected by the 
competing privilege right and inspection and use right in order 
to determine whether these competing interests can be 
accommodated or whether one right prevails over the other is a 
proper way to resolve the issue presented.  After all, such 
balancing is the “inevitable element of the common-law process” 
generally engaged in by the court to determine the rule or 
portion to adopt.197 
With such balancing employed, attorney-client privilege 
protection should not be available for a writing otherwise 
protectable by the privilege, as the invocation of the privilege 
would restrict the ability to determine if the refreshing 
recollection process was being used to create fraudulent or 
perjured testimony – the purpose of the inspection right. The 
truth-seeking purpose of the inspection right should therefore 
prevail.198  As to the materials prepared for litigation privilege, 
it too should yield to the inspection right.  In that regard, the 
protection interest of the privilege should not preclude the 
inspection right because in the circumstances – witness is 
testifying – the privilege’s qualifying condition, the need for the 
material in the interest of justice, is present.199 
Whether the work product privilege should give way 
presents a more difficult situation due to that privilege’s 
“absolute nature.”  As the conflict essentially amounts to 
 
195.  People v. Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d 380, 394 (N.Y. 1954). 
196.  Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1870). 
197.  Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 649 (N.Y. 2004).  
198.  It should be noted that this loss of protection will occur when the 
client or another privileged person is the person whose recollection is being 
refreshed.  When the witness is a third-party, the disclosure to that witness 
will defeat the privilege doctrine as a waiver of the privilege has occurred based 
on disclosure to a non-privileged person. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2000). 
199.  See Yasnogordsky v. City of New York, 722 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (App. 
Div. 2001) (need for witness statement); Rochford v. Long Island R.R. Co., 710 
N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 2000) (need for witness statement). 
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protecting the attorney’s opinions, etc. versus ascertaining the 
truth, public policy would strongly suggest the truth interest 
should prevail.200  To be sure, the Court in Beach v. Touradji 
Capital Management, LP concluded otherwise with respect to an 
attorney work product privilege claim asserted with respect to 
privileged document used to refresh a witness’s recollection prior 
to testifying at a deposition.201  The Court held that the absolute 
nature of the privileged precluded a waiver.202  However, 
different interests are involved when the refreshing recollection 
doctrine is used before a witness testifies at deposition, which 
can justify the holding.203  Alternatively, the result in Beach 
reflects a questionable policy choice.  In short, Beach does not 
support a loss of attorney work product privilege protection 
when a testifying witness is involved. 
Nonetheless, support for a conclusion that the work product 
protection, despite being viewed as absolute, is lost can be found 
in federal court decisions decided before Rule 612 became 
effective and state court decisions based on state common law 
interpreting their states’ refreshing recollection doctrine. These 
decisions held that the inspection right under the common law 
trumped any right against disclosure.204  These decisions are all 
based upon a finding that the use of the privileged document 
effected a waiver of the privilege applicable to the document.  
This waiver basis was expressed by the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. O’Brien as follows: 
 
Although the [refreshing recollection] rule does 
not address itself directly to the issue of writings 
protected by the work product doctrine, Federal 
courts have held that the use of protected writings 
 
200.  See Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Mass. 1995); 
City of Denison v. Grisham, 716 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. App. 1986). 
201.  Beach v. Touradji Cap. Mgmt., LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 
2012). 
202.  Id. at 670. 
203.  See RICE ET AL., supra note 52, at 146. 
204.  See, e.g., Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1927); 
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1972); O’Brien, 645 
N.E.2d at 1175; Summerlin v. State, 271 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ind. 1971); see also 
BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 59, 577 (at the common law any applicable 
privilege lost when privileged document used to refresh recollection). 
43
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to refresh memory on the stand constitutes a 
waiver of that protection and the material used to 
refresh memory must be shown to the opposing 
party if requested.205 
 
Three justifications have generally been advanced for this 
waiver approach.206  First, it has been argued that waiver is 
proper as the examining attorney on behalf of his or her client 
has intentionally relinquished the applicable privilege as 
established by the knowing choice of a privileged writing, rather 
than a non-privileged writing, to show the witness.207  As noted 
by a commentator, “[w]here the choice lies with the privilege 
holder as to waive or not to waive, waiver upon disclosure to a 
witness should be a no-brainer and should follow as the night 
follows the day.”208  A second argument is that as the testimony 
prompted by the document will necessarily disclose the contents 
of a document used for refreshing recollection purposes, the 
disclosure has effected a waiver.209  The third argument is that 
as a rule precluding disclosure in the circumstances involved 
would impair fairness of the trial process, a waiver rule is 
necessary to prevent that result.210  As forcefully stated in 
O’Brien: 
 
It is clear to us that a rule against disclosure in 
these circumstances would impair the fairness of 
the trial process. For example, examining counsel 
might choose only protected materials to refresh a 
witness’s recollection in order to avoid a 
potentially damaging cross-examination by 
opposing counsel. There is also, obviously, the 
 
205.  O’Brien, 645 N.E.2d at 1175 (footnote omitted). 
206.  See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 70, at § 6185 (discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses of these justifications). 
207.  Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bailey, 55 F.R.D. at 213. 
208.  1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE 
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 750 (6th ed. 2017). 
209.  1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE MANUAL 706 (5th ed. 1990). 
210.  Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1176 (Mass. 1995) 
(footnote omitted). 
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danger of witness prompting by examining 
counsel. Without the right to inspect the protected 
writing, opposing counsel would have no 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to the 
accuracy of the writing and its effect on his or her 
memory.  Results such as these would go a long 
way toward impairing the judicial process and are 
therefore clearly unacceptable.211 
 
The O’Brien unfairness rationale underlying its finding of a 
waiver of privilege provides a separate and independent reason 
for New York’s acceptance of a rule requiring the loss of 
privileged status of a writing when used to refresh the 
recollection of a witness while testifying.  In that regard, it is 
consistent with New York Law which recognizes the waiver of a 
privilege when the privileged document is being used as a sword 
and not as a shield, which would, if permitted, create an unfair 
or unjust result.212  Such is the situation when the privileged 
document is being used to refresh recollection, with the potential 
of creating manufactured evidence. 
In sum, New York’s refreshing recollection doctrine as 
applied to testifying witnesses should include a waiver of 
privilege component and it is likely that the Court of Appeals 
when it addresses the issue will so rule.  Such a rule 
complements the doctrine’s right of inspection and use of the 
writing used to refresh the testifying witness’s recollection, and 







211.  Id. (footnote omitted); see also BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 59 
(“Finding a waiver when the writing is consulted by the witness while 
testifying is obviously warranted; it would be patently unfair for a witness to 
consult the writing while testifying in open court but refuse to allow the 
opposing counsel to see the writing.”). 
212.  Am. Re-Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 837 N.Y.S.2d 616, 622 (App. 
Div. 2007); see also McKinney v. Grand St., Prospect Park & Flatbush R.R. Co., 
10 N.E. 544, 544 (N.Y. 1887).  
45
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IV. Applying New York’s Refreshing Recollection Doctrine to 
Witnesses before Testifying 
 
 A. Introduction 
 
An attorney in New York, as in all jurisdictions,213 can both 
legally and ethically meet with a witness before the witness 
testifies at a trial or a deposition in pending litigation to review 
the witness’s knowledge about the subject matter of the 
witness’s testimony and, in the course of that review, show the 
witness a writing or other object to refresh the witness’s 
recollection.214  Whether the opposing party then has any right 
to have that writing or object disclosed, as under Rule 612, is an 
issue that the Court of Appeals has not addressed.215  While 
there are numerous Appellate Division decisions holding the 
common law right of inspection and use of writings and objects 
used to refresh a witness’s recollection while testifying at a trial 
or deposition extends to the witness preparation situation, these 
decisions, as will be shown, are conflicting and, for the most part, 
lack any in-depth analysis of the issue presented.  The governing 
rules on this issue are uncertain. 
Under the New York’s common law, there are essentially 
three possible approaches: (1) deny a right of inspection and use; 
(2) recognize an unqualified right of inspection and use; and (3) 
authorize a court to grant a right of inspection and use in its 
discretion.216  As to the third approach, it raises a further issue 
as to whether the discretionary authority permits the court to 
override any privilege claims or whether privileges must always 
be respected in the exercise of that authority. Rule 612, as 
previously discussed, can be used for guidance.217  This part will 
address these approaches, note the federal approaches, and in 
doing so advocate a position that the New York courts should 
 
213.  See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
214.  See In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 171 (1880).  However, there are 
specific limitations set forth in Rule 4.2 of the New York’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2009) (limitations on 
contacting represented individuals).  
215.  See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
216.  See BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 577. 
217.  See supra notes 86-119 and accompanying text. 
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consider and adopt. 
 
B. Applicability of the Doctrine 
 
At common law, the early cases in the United States refused 
to extend the recognized right of inspection with respect to 
writings or objects to refresh a witness’s recollection to writings 
or objects reviewed by a witness for refreshing recollection 
purposes prior to testifying.218  The basis for this conclusion was 
stated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as follows: 
 
The right of an opposing party to examine any 
paper used to refresh the recollection of any 
witness on the stand at the trial is beyond 
doubt. . . . But to extend this right to every paper 
seen by a witness in the preparation of the case 
before trial is a different matter. Such an 
extension of the principle might turn every trial 
into a fishing expedition and place a powerful 
weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous 
attorney.219 
 
This result was criticized by the leading evidence scholars 
at the time.  Thus, Dean Wigmore wrote that the right of 
inspection and use as applied to a testifying witness 
 
should apply . . . to a memorandum consulted for 
refreshment before trial and not brought by the 
witness into court; for, though there is no 
objection to a memory being thus stimulated, yet 
the risk of imposition and the need of safeguard is 
just as great. It is simple and feasible enough for 
the court to require that the paper be sent for and 
exhibited before the end of the trial.220 
 
218.  See, e.g., Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1927); 
Leonard v. Taylor, 53 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Mass. 1944); State v. Magers, 58 P. 892, 
896 (Or. 1899). 
219.  Leonard, 53 N.E.2d at 707 (citation omitted). 
220.  WIGMORE, supra note 129, at 140-41 (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Professor McCormick wrote: “[t]he reasons [for the 
testifying rule] seem equally applicable to writings used by the 
witness to refresh his memory before he testifies.”221 
With this criticism, another view emerged, recognizing that 
the right of inspection should apply, not as an absolute right, but 
rather as a discretionary right subject to a court’s sound 
discretion.222  Those courts expressing this view showed a clear 
repudiation of the earlier decisions, as shown in State v. 
Mucci.223  The New Jersey Supreme Court used this case to 
revisit its earlier precedent rejecting the extension of the right 
to the pre-trial situation.  In this criminal case, several of the 
State’s witnesses refreshed their recollection prior to trial by 
reading and discussing their earlier grand jury testimony.  In 
the course of their cross-examination, Defendant applied to 
inspect the grand jury testimony admittedly used to refresh the 
witness’s recollection, and the application was denied by the 
trial court.224  The New Jersey Supreme Court held this ruling 
to be reversible error.  The Court emphasized that as a State’s 
witness may properly refresh his recollection by examining his 
grand jury testimony either before trial or while he is on the 
witness stand, Defendant must then be given the right to inspect 
the earlier testimony for purposes of cross-examination.  The 
Court unequivocally rejected any distinction between the 
situation where the witness refreshes his recollection before trial 
from that where he refreshes it at trial, pointing out that “the 
one case is as compelling in reason and logic as the other,” citing 
Dean Wigmore.225  In so concluding, the Court expressly 
disapproved of its earlier decisions denying access.226 
The view expressed in Mucci has been followed in the vast 
majority of the state courts.227  As commented by Professor 
 
221.  CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK ET. AL., MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 17-18 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972). 
222.  See, e.g., Needelman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802, 806-07 (5th Cir. 
1958); La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 168 (D. Del. 1973); 
Alpha Finley v. Daly Tankship Corp., 44 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1942); 
People v. Scott, 193 N.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Ill. 1963). 
223.  State v. Mucci, 136 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1957). 
224.  Id. at 766-67. 
225.  Id. at 767. 
226.  Id. at 767-68. 
227.  See BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 58 (noting that “[t]he most 
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McCormick, “[d]oubtless the courts have thought that to require 
inspection of such papers may unduly encourage prying into the 
opponent’s file, but increasingly, the decisions reflect the view 
that there is a public interest in the full disclosure of the source 
of a witness’s testimony.”228 
There is, however, a distinct minority of state courts that 
adhere to the earlier judicial view that the inspection right does 
not extend to pre-trial or pre-deposition situations.229  The basis 
of their adherence to this no inspection rule is that the majority 
and federal rule, which permits a court to override a privilege, 
“weakens the attorney-client and work product privileges, both 
by actual disclosure and by the chilling effect of potential 
disclosure of documents.”230 
In New York, prior to 1971, the status of the application of 
the right of inspection and use to witnesses prior to testifying at 
a trial or deposition was unclear.231  The Second Department in 
People v. Campiglia held the trial court erred in not permitting 
Defendant to examine statements made by the prosecution 
witness and given to the police, which they had used to refresh 
their recollection before trial.232  However, the Court cited no 
authority for its conclusion and its holding appeared to be 
limited to the precise facts before it – the review of the 
statements occurred “immediately prior to testifying.”233  On the 
other hand, the Court in Alfredsen v. Loomis ruled that 
disclosure of a statement used by a witness to refresh his 
recollection the day before testifying at a deposition was 
required.234  It noted “[t]he time when the memorandum of 
statement was referred to by the witness, whether at the trial or 
examination or prior thereto, would seem unimportant. The 
 
important factor in accelerating this trend has been the adoption of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 612.”). See also Las Vegas Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Eighth Jud. 
Dist. Court, 325 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Nev. 2014) (adopting the majority rule as it 
found “federal caselaw on this issue to be persuasive”). 
228.  MCCORMICK ET. AL., supra note 221, at 18.  
229.  See State ex rel. Polytech, Inc. v. Voorhees, 895 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Mo. 
1995) (collecting cases).  
230.  Id. at 15. 
231.  JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 467 (10th ed. 1973). 
232.  People v. Campiglia, 16 N.Y.S.2d 370, 370 (App. Div. 1939), aff’d, 39 
N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1942). 
233.  Id. 
234.  Alfredsen v. Loomis, 148 N.Y.S.2d 468, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1956). 
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important fact is that it was used by him to refresh his 
recollection and that it accomplished that purpose.”235 Other 
decisions seemed to reject the extension of the right to the pre-
trial or pre-deposition situation, or at the very least were unclear 
as to the rule that applied in that situation.236 
Post-1971, the rule became clear, namely, there is a right of 
inspection with respect to writings or objects used by a witness 
prior to testifying, the result of a series of Appellate Division 
decisions.237  In Doxtator v. Swarthout, the first of these 
decisions, the Defendant physician in a medical malpractice 
action testified at her deposition that, “she had reviewed some 
notes made after the [underlying] incident. . . and that these 
were used by her to refresh her recollection with respect to the 
details of her testimony.”238  The trial court denied production of 
the notes.239  The Fourth Department phrased the issue before 
it as whether “the rule regarding inspection applied at an 
examination before trial should be no more stringent than the 
rule applicable to trial testimony.”240  The Court then held there 
are “persuasive reasons to permit [the] inspection.”241  Those 
reasons were expressed as follows: 
 
Two of the leading texts on evidence in New York 
favor application of the same rule to writings 
consulted by a witness before trial as to those 
during trial . . . for the reason that the ‘risk to the 
adversary is precisely the same whether the 
witness refreshes his recollection by consulting a 
writing before trial or by consulting it while on the 
witness stand during trial.’ We think it a sound 
rule that writings used prior to testifying for the 
purpose of refreshing the memory of a witness be 
 
235.  Id. (citation omitted). 
236.  See Bata v. Chase Safe Deposit Co., 99 N.Y.S.2d 535, 578-79 (Sup. 
Ct. 1950), aff’d sub nom. Bata v. Bata, 108 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 1951), aff’d, 
115 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y. 1953); In re Hewett’s Will, 70 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 1947), 
aff’d, 74 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1947). 
237.  FARRELL, supra note 124, § 6-215, at 365. 
238.  Doxtator v. Swarthout, 328 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App. Div. 1972). 
 239.    Id. 
240.  Id. (citations omitted). 
241.  Id. 
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made available to the adversary whether at the 
trial . . . or at pre-trial examination.242 
 
All the other Appellate Division Departments have since 
followed Doxtator.243 
Extending the right of inspection and use of writings and 
objects used to refresh the recollection of a witness before 
testifying at a trial or a deposition reflects sound public policy.  
While it may be true that such an extension can lead to fishing 
expeditions, trial delays due to the need to obtain a document 
protracted on cross-examination, and the abrogation of privilege 
rights, those concerns can be addressed in follow-up issues, 
specifically, whether the pre-trial or pre-deposition right is 
absolute and automatically granted and whether privilege 
policies should be respected or accommodated, as discussed 
infra.244  In the end, the extension should be viewed by asking 
the following rhetorical question posed by a commentator: “[I]s 
there any reason why we should have one rule for a witness who 
refers to a writing on the witness stand to refresh his memory 
and a different rule for a witness who refers to a writing on the 
courthouse steps for the same purpose?”245 












242.  Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted). 
243.  See, e.g., Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 
1987); Rouse v. Cty. of Greene, 495 N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (App. Div. 1985); 
Merrill Lynch Realty Commercial Servs. Inc. v. Rudin Mgmt. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 
16, 17 (App. Div. 1983). 
244.  See infra notes 263-88 and accompanying text. 
245.  John C. Burke, Witness Rules Change, Codify Nebraska Law, 53 
NEB. L. REV. 406, 414 (1974). 
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 C. Used to Refresh Recollection 
 
New York law, as shown in the preceding section, authorizes 
the inspection of a writing or object if a witness used the writing 
or object while preparing to testify at a trial or deposition.  What 
constitutes use by the witness?  In the absence of Court of 
Appeals precedent, there are conflicting lines of authority. 
The first line is represented by decisions from the First, 
Third, and Fourth Departments.246  These decisions hold the 
right of inspection is triggered only when the witness had 
actually used the material to refresh recollection and the 
material has become the basis of pretrial or trial testimony.247  
This definition is consistent with the inspection right’s purpose, 
i.e., to examine fully the witness’s credibility, lest manufactured 
evidenced is admitted.248  It is also sound as it is responsive to 
the fishing expedition objection that material that has to be 
produced is limited to only the material actually used for 
refreshing recollection purposes.  Expressed differently, if the 
materials were not used to refresh recollection and did not form 
the basis of the actual testimony, the materials have no 
relevance to the witness’s credibility.249  This foundation element 
for invoking the inspection right is consistent with federal case 
law interpreting Rule 612, which has helped to limit abuse of the 
inspection right.250 
A foundation for a court to conclude the requisite use is 
present will have to be established.  An example of a successful 
effort in establishing the foundation is in Alfredsen v. Loomis.251  
At a witness’s deposition, the following questions were asked 




246.  See, e.g., Fernekes v. Catskill Reg’l Med. Ctr., 906 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169 
(App. Div. 2010); Stern v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 730, 730 (App. 
Div. 1990); Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97; Merrill Lynch Realty Commercial 
Servs. Inc., 462 N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
247.  See Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 730. 
248.  Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1870). 
249.  See Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 497. 
250.  See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text. 
251.  Alfredsen v. Loomis, 148 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1956). 
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Q.  Since that time, have you seen that statement 
that you gave to Mr. Cherin? 
A.  Yes, sir. 
Q.  When? 
A.  I have a copy of it. 
Q.  You have a copy of it?  When did you last read 
it? 
A.  Yesterday. 
Q.  What was the purpose of your reading it 
yesterday? 
A.  To refresh me a little bit about the dates. 
Q.  And about the things there were in the 
statement?  Is that the purpose of it? 
A.  I remember some of – Well, yes. * * * 
Q.  When you read it yesterday, did it help to 
refresh your recollection of a lot of things? 
A.  I remembered the things in the statement.252 
 
The witness’s answers showed to the Court the “important 
fact” that the statement was used by him to refresh his 
recollection and that it accomplished that purpose.253 
On the other hand, the following Q and A was found to be 
insufficient to establish the requisite foundation in Timm v. 
Mead Corp.:254 
 
Question: What did you do to prepare for this 
deposition today? 
Answer: When I copied all of the documentation I 
took another pass through it. 
Question:  Meaning you reviewed the documents 
as you copied them? 
Answer:  I copied them, took them whole, had the 
stack and kind of walked through to try to refresh 
my memory. 
 
252.  Id. at 469. 
253.  Id. at 470. 
254.  Timm v. Mead Corp., No. 91 C 5648, 1992 WL 32280, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 7, 1992). 
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Question:  When you say you walked through it or 
as you passed through them, does that mean you 
read each and every one of them.  Or that you just 
took a glance at each page? 
Answer:  Basically, just took a glance.255 
 
The Court took “[f]rom this testimony it is not possible to 
conclude that the deponent reviewed and relied upon the 
documents in giving his testimony, nor is it possible to conclude 
that the documents had any impact on his testimony.”256  The 
Court denied production of the notes as a result.257 
Of course, a witness could frustrate such an inquiry in order 
to preclude production of the materials by not being fully 
truthful in responding to the questions.  However, such conduct 
could be overcome by the party seeking production by further 
questioning the witness concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the witness’s overall preparation, and the receipt 
and viewing of the materials, i.e., only document reviewed, 
length of time reviewing.  The answers can form sufficient 
circumstantial proof to establish the requisite use.258 
The other line of authority is represented by a decision from 
the Second Department, Crawford v. Lahiri.259  In this case, a 
wrongful death medical malpractice action, Plaintiff sought 
disclosure of any records reflecting treatment of the Plaintiff’s 
decedent reviewed by the Defendant physician in preparation for 
his deposition.  The Court ordered disclosure stating: 
 
[I]f [Defendant] reviewed any records regarding 
the plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment in preparation 
for his testimony, he was required to divulge that 
fact and turn over the records, whether or not his 
review was expressly admitted to be for purposes 
 
255.  Id. at *1-2. 
256.  Id. at *6. 
257.  Id. 
258.  See Chabica v. Schneider, 624 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (App. Div. 1995) 
(witness “looked at” and “read” his diary immediately before trial; diary 
contained his notes of conversations with Defendant after the incident). See 
also RICE ET AL., supra note 52, § 9:30, at 150-52. 
259.  Crawford v. Lahiri, 673 N.Y.S.2d 189 (App. Div. 1998).  
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of refreshing his recollection.260 
 
Under this broad interpretation of “use,” the Court has set 
up a low threshold for invoking the inspection right, namely, a 
witness’s “looking at” a document prior to testifying.261 
Crawford is an outlier in its adoption of such a low threshold 
for triggering the inspection right in view of the other Appellate 
Division decisions, and as well the federal case law interpreting 
Rule 612, which the other New York decisions follow, all of which 
require substantially more than just “looking at” the material.262  
The Second Department cited no precedent on point in support 
of its conclusion.263  To the extent its purported justification is 
that this low threshold will prevent a witness from barring 
inspection by an averment that he or she did not rely on the 
material in refreshing recollection, such goal can be 
accomplished by other means, as just noted above.  This view, 
which in effect condones fishing expeditions, has not withstood 
analysis and should not be followed. 
 
 D. Mandatory or Discretionary Right 
 
Concluding that the right of inspection does apply to 
writings or objects actually used to refresh the recollection of 
witnesses before testifying at a trial or deposition does not end 
analysis of the right.  The further issue that now needs to be 
addressed is whether New York’s common law should make this 
right mandatory or discretionary, the latter allowing the court 
to grant or withhold the right.  As the backdrop for this issue, 
Rule 612 provides the right of inspection is discretionary in 
situations involving the preparation of trial witnesses or 
deposition witnesses.264 
 
260.  Id. at 191 (citations omitted). 
261.  Id. 
262.  See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text. 
263.  The cases cited in support, McDonough, Chabica, and Stern, in fact, 
stand for the proposition that the materials viewed were used for refreshing 
recollection purposes and that they became the basis for the witness’s 
testimony. See McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1997); 
Chabica v. Schneider, 624 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div. 1995); Stern v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 730 (App. Div. 1990). 
264.  See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
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The unanimous view of all of the Appellate Division 
Departments is that the right of inspection when invoked at 
either a trial or a deposition is a mandatory right.265  Thus, once 
it is established that a witness used the writing or object for 
refreshing his or her recollection and the material formed the 
basis of his or her testimony at the trial or deposition, the Court 
must direct production of that material to the opposing party, 
subject to a possible privilege claim.266  The rationale for holding 
this right to be mandatory in all situations was expressed by the 
Appellate Division Fourth Department as follows: 
 
When these notes were used by [the] defendant to 
refresh her recollection, they became material 
affirmatively used in litigation and thus removed 
from the protection afforded under discovery 
practice, because her adversary then had a 
legitimate interest in inspecting this material in 
order to conduct a meaningful examination.267 
 
The above stated rationale is certainly persuasive enough to 
support the mandatory nature of the right.  This is especially 
true as it furthers the goal of this right to guard against 
manufactured evidence.268  Nonetheless, problems can arise once 
production is directed as a matter of right, which might suggest 
this mandatory rule should be continued. 
When the mandatory right is invoked at trial, and the 
witness does not bring the refreshing material to court, an 
adjournment of the trial would be in order to allow the witness 
to obtain it.  If the material is readily available, i.e., at the 
attorney’s nearby office or the witness’s nearby office or home, 
only a brief recess would be in order.  However, even such a brief 
recess would be disruptive of the trial process, especially the 
cross-examination which is interrupted.  Moreover, if the 
 
265.  See, e.g., McDonough, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 
730; Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 1987); Rouse v. 
Cty. of Greene, 495 N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (App. Div. 1985). 
266.  See McDonough, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 730; 
Grieco, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 432; Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97. 
267.  Doxtator v. Swarthout, 328 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (App. Div. 1974). 
268.  See Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1870). 
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material were at a distant location, a brief recess would turn into 
a lengthy one, making a delay in the trial even longer, causing 
scheduling problems and inconveniencing jurors. 
It is certainly possible to prevent this problem by a court 
directive commanding all witnesses to bring to court with them 
material they reviewed so that in the event it is determined that 
the witness in fact used the material to refresh his or her 
recollection, thereby triggering disclosure, the material is 
available during cross-examination.269  However, gathering the 
materials looked at, and bringing it to court could seriously 
inconvenience the witness.  An additional issue could also arise 
if the witness fails to comply with such a direction, namely 
sanctions, if any, to be meted out for the failure, e.g., contempt, 
monetary sanction, or even the striking of the witness’s direct. 
Similar problems arise with deposition witnesses.  If it is 
determined that the witness used material to refresh his or her 
recollection before the testimony begins and the witness did not 
bring the material to the deposition or the material not 
otherwise readily available, the deposition will need to be 
adjourned and rescheduled, causing delays in the pre-trial 
discovery process.  While motion practice seeking an order to 
compel production prior to the deposition could be pursued,270 
time and expense would have to be incurred to make the motion, 
which would be compounded if an appeal were taken from the 
order determining the motion.271 
These problems cannot be labeled trivial.  While 
enforcement of the “use” requirement should reduce the extent 
of these problems, it is clear there will be instances where the 
requirement is met, triggering the mandatory production 




269.  New York’s Third Judicial District established a local rule which 
provides that “[e]xperts who testify at trial must bring with them to Court their 
entire file and all documents considered in arriving at their opinion(s).” N.Y. 
State Unified Court Sys., Trial Rules and Special Directives, NYCOURTS.GOV 
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/3jd/JudgesRules/3JD-Judges% 
20Rules.shtml#trialrules.  No provision in the C.P.L.R. would bar a judge from 
adopting a similar rule with respect to fact witnesses. 
270.  See Crawford v. Lahiri, 673 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (App. Div. 1998). 
271.  Id. 
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A modification of the current common law established 
mandatory right of inspection is in order.  The preferable 
approach, similar to the approach of Rule 612, is to modify 
current law by eliminating the mandatory nature of the right 
and in its place, require production of the material used only if 
a court in the exercise of its discretion decides disclosure is 
warranted “if justice so requires.”272  The New York courts have 
considerable experience in applying such a standard as the basis 
for a judicial ruling in view of the numerous instances in the 
C.P.L.R. that direct a court to act in “the interest of justice.”273  
Sufficient room is left for a court to order production when 
circumstances warrant it, e.g., suspicion of the creation of 
manufactured evidence. 
 
E. Claim of Privilege 
 
Before disclosure of the refreshing material used can be 
ordered by a court in the exercises of its discretion, it is 
necessary to determine whether the material used is protected 
by a privilege and, if it is so protected, whether the privileged 
status can preclude disclosure of material.  As previously noted, 
the pertinent privileges are the attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work-product privilege, and materials prepared for 
litigation privilege.274  As also previously noted, privilege 
protection for materials used to refresh a witness’s recollection 
while testifying is ordinarily lost, or should be lost, under a 
waiver theory.275  Should this same result occur in the pre-trial 
or pre-deposition situation? 
The New York courts are split on the issue.  The split 
appears to turn upon conflicting views as to whether the strong 
interest in disclosure of material used for refreshing recollection 
purposes always overrides the interest of privileges in limiting 
disclosure to further other interests, or whether disclosure must 
 
272.  FED. R. EVID. 612(c). 
273.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2005 (McKinney 2005) (excusing delay or 
default); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 306-b (McKinney 2013) (extension of time to serve 
complaint); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3403(a)(3) (McKinney 2007) (trial preferences); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 4404(a) (McKinney 2007) (motion for new trial).   
274.  See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 
275.  See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
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yield at times to the separate and different interests of the 
particular privilege involved. Two lines of decision, with splits 
within each line as well, have emerged. 
The First, Second, and Fourth Departments have expressed 
the view that “any” privilege which applies to the material used 
is automatically waived by that use.276  This conclusion of waiver 
is based upon the courts’ view that the right of inspection is 
absolute.277 
The other line of cases approaches and resolves the issue by 
considering the underlying policy of the particular privilege 
being asserted.  Starting first with the attorney-client privilege, 
two reported decisions have considered attorney-client privilege 
claims.  In Falk v. Kalt, Plaintiff used several confidential 
communications between Plaintiff and his attorney to refresh 
his recollection before his deposition.278  The Court considered 
these communications to be protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.279  The Court then held there was no waiver, based on 
its “opinion that an adversary’s right to examine writings used 
to refresh memory must be limited by the greater sanctity 
accorded confidential communications between attorney and 
client.”280  On the other hand, in E.R. Carpenter Co. v. ABC 
Carpet Co., Inc., the Court ordered disclosure of a claimed 
memorandum which Plaintiff argued was protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.281  It held that even if the 
memorandum were protected by the privilege, waiver was 
present by reason of the use of the memorandum to refresh the 
Plaintiff’s recollection prior to his deposition.282  Noting that the 
 
276.  See McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (App. Div. 1997); 
Stern v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 730, 730 (App. Div. 1990); Grieco 
v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 1987); Merrill Lynch Realty 
Commercial Servs. v. Rudin Mgt. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (App. Div. 1983); 
Doxtator v. Swarthout, 328 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (App. Div. 1974).  In none of 
these cases was the privilege invoked specified.   
277.  McDonough, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 730; Grieco, 
512 N.Y.S.2d at 432; Merrill Lynch Realty Commercial Servs., 462 N.Y.S.2d at 
17; Doxtator, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 152.  
278.  Falk v. Kalt, 253 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
279.  Id. at 189. 
280.  Id. 
281.  E.R. Carpenter Co. v. ABC Carpet Co., 415 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Civ. Ct. 
1979). 
282.  Id. at 353. 
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issue before it was a “most difficult question as it seemingly 
places the essential attorney-client privilege in direct conflict 
with the just-as-essential right of cross-examination,”283 the 
Court held “basic considerations of fair play” and the inspection 
right’s goal of preventing the admission of “manufactured 
evidence,” outweighed the goal of the attorney-client privilege.284 
The First Department, departing from its view that any 
privilege is waived, held in Beach v. Touradji Capital 
Management, LP285 that use of materials protected by the 
attorney work-product privilege used for refreshing recollection 
purposes does not result in a waiver of the privilege.286  Citing in 
support a decision from the Third Department287 and a decision 
from the Fourth Department,288 which previously so held, the 
First Department concluded that due to the absolute nature of 
protection accorded that privilege, it could not be abrogated 
merely by its refreshing recollection use.289  On the other hand, 
the Second Department in Grieco v. Cunningham held to the 
contrary.290  The Court rejected an effort to treat attorney work-
product protected writings differently, due to its unique policy, 
from other privileges where waiver is automatic.291 
There is unanimity, however, among the courts with respect 
to documents protected by the materials prepared for litigation 
privilege – this privilege is waived.292  The basis for this 
conclusion is the privilege’s conditional nature, i.e., the privilege 
is defeated if it is shown that withholding it would result in 
injustice or undue hardship,293 and not absolute as with the 
 
283.  Id. 
284.  Id. 
285.  Beach v. Touradji Cap. Mgmt., LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 
2012). 
286.  Id. at 669. 
287.  Fernekes v. Catskill Reg’l Med. Ctr., 906 N.Y.S.2d 167, 170 (App. 
Div. 2010). 
288.  Geffers v. Canisteo Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 463201, 482 N.Y.S.2d 635, 
636 (App. Div. 1984). 
289.  Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70. 
290.  Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 1987). 
291.  Id.  
292.  See, e.g., Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70; Rouse v. Cty. of Greene, 495 
N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (App Div. 1985). 
293.  Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 497. 
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attorney work-product doctrine.294  In essence, the basis for the 
waiver is the privilege itself as depriving the cross-examiner 
access to the writing is an unjust result.295  Notably, the First 
Department has pointed out the different waiver result 
depending upon whether the document is protected by the 
attorney work-product privilege or the materials prepared for 
litigation purposes.296 
The First Department in Matter of Lenny McN added 
another factor for consideration when waiver is in issue, the 
nature of the proceeding involved.297  In this case the Court held 
a social worker’s review of a confidential case file of a social 
worker prior to testifying in a Family Court proceeding to 
determine custody in the best interest of an infant did not 
constitute a wholesale waiver of the privileges that attached to 
the file.298  In the Court’s view, “the confidentiality and 
sensitivity of Family Court custodial litigation clearly call for 
stricter limitations [on the refreshing recollection privilege 
waiver rule].”299  Whether privileges could ever be waived in a 
Family Court proceeding has not been the subject of any further 
discussion. 
The conflicting decisions create much uncertainty as to 
whether a privilege is waived when the privileged material is 
used to refresh a witness’s recollection before testifying at a trial 
or a deposition, with a potentially sweeping risk of waiver 
looming large by such use.  Clarification by the Court of Appeals, 
if not by the Legislature, is needed. 
What should be the nature of such clarification?  There is 
much to commend the view that the attorney-client privilege and 
the attorney work-product privilege is not waived by a pre-trial 
or pre-deposition use of the material protected, based on their 
protective policies.  Likewise, the conclusion that the materials 
prepared for litigation privilege is waived by use of material 
 
294.  Id. 
295.  See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 548. 
296.  Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 670. The court remanded the case to the trial 
court to determine which of the two privileges are applicable to the various 
types of material used for refreshing recollection purposes. Id. 
297.  In re Lenny McN, 584 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1992). 
298.  Id. at 18. 
299.  Id.  
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protected by that privilege for refreshing recollection purposes 
pre-trial or pre-deposition is based on supportable policy 
grounds.  Adoption of these conclusion as part of New York’s 
common law would eliminate the current uncertainty with 
workable waiver rule. 
To be sure, this position is at odds with the conclusion that 
use of a writing or object to refresh the recollection of a witness 
while testifying waives any privilege that attaches to such 
material.300  However, different treatment is warranted.  In this 
regard, the waiver rule applicable to testifying witnesses is 
largely based on unfairness concerns that would be present if 
one party could freely use the material to refresh a witness’s 
recollection on the witness stand while preventing other parties 
from ever seeing the material.301  This situation has been 
described as “bizarre.”302  However, when the privilege material 
is used before a trial or deposition, the risk of unfairness is not 
that great when a privilege bars production of materials used 
before a trial or hearing.303 
Nonetheless, a broad anti-waiver rule would create an 
untenable situation where the material is reviewed for 
refreshing recollection purposes shortly before testifying.  Since 
the review is intended to refresh the witness’s recollection on a 
matter the witness will soon testify about, the refreshing 
recollection process is in essence the equivalent of refreshing 
recollection while testifying.  To argue that waiver cannot 
automatically occur because the process is not occurring “‘while 
testifying’ . . . elevates form over substance,” and thus is a 
questionable argument.304  Certainly, the waiver rule applicable 
to witnesses “while testifying” should apply in this situation. 
On balance, a workable and fair resolution of the privilege 
waiver issue would be that the attorney-client privilege and the 
attorney work-product privilege is not waived by the use of a 
writing or object protected by either of those privileges for 
refreshing a witness’s recollection before testifying at a trial or 
hearing, but the material proposed for litigation privilege is 
 
300.  See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
301.  See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text. 
302.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, § 6:94, at 593. 
303.  Id. at 597-98.  
304.  Cf. RICE ET AL., supra note 52, § 9:40, at 260. 
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waived.  While a court would have no discretion to rule 
otherwise, it would have discretion to determine whether a 
refreshing recollection process should be deemed to have 
occurred “while testifying” when the process occurs close to the 




What can an attorney learn from the above discussion of 
New York law as to the consequences of a witness reviewing 
privileged documents before testifying at a trial or deposition?  
There is a right of inspection given to opposing attorneys of 
writings used in a witness preparation session to refresh the 
witness’s recollection about a relevant fact before testifying at a 
trial or deposition where that writing had a clear impact on the 
witness’s testimony. 
The fact that the writing is protected against disclosure by 
a privilege recognized in New York law may or may not preclude 
the exercise of that inspection right.  Present law is decidedly 
unclear about the effect of a privilege claim raised in response to 
a demand for inspection. 
Present law will obviously have a substantial overall effect 
on an attorney’s decision as to what should be provided to the 
witness for review, and how the refreshing recollection process 
is handled.  Viewing that decision from the perspective of the 
opposing attorney, it can be expected that the attorney on his or 
her examination of the witness will ask: “Have you reviewed any 
materials in preparation for your testimony here?”; and if the 
answer is “Yes”, the immediate follow-up question will be: 
“Please specifically identify the materials reviewed.”  From that 
point, the attorney will explore whether that review was 
engaged in in order to refresh the witness’s recollection, thereby 
triggering the inspection right. 
How then should an attorney proceed in preparing a witness 
in advance of the witness’s testimony at a trial or deposition?  
Initially, it is imperative that the attorney proceed cautiously, 
lest a privileged document containing sensitive information ends 
up in the hands of the opposing party’s attorney.  Indeed, the 
attorney should presume that any document used in the 
preparation session to refresh the recollection of a witness will 
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end up in the hands of the opposing attorney.  The attorney 
should not just provide the witness with all the writings that 
could refresh recollection at the start of the preparation and ask 
the witness to review them.  Rather, the attorney should start 
by asking the witness whether the witness remembers an event 
to determine whether the witness needs memory help.  If the 
witness does not, then the attorney should review the pertinent 
writings that have potential for refreshing recollection and 
determine which of those writings are protected by privilege.  
Only the non-privileged writings should be provided to the 
witness.  Where the only writing available for refreshing 
recollection purposes is privileged, the attorney will need to 
decide whether the witness’s testimony is so important to the 
attorney’s case that the possible loss of privilege is outweighed 
by the need for the testimony. 
In sum, under present New York law an attorney preparing 
a witness cannot reasonably expect that the confidentiality of 
writings used in the course of the preparation will remain 
confidential, even if privileged.  Full understanding of the 
consequences of showing a privileged writing, as discussed in 
this article, is necessary for the attorney to competently 
represent the attorney’s client. 
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